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This thesis studies how suitable Security Information and Event Management systems (SIEM 
systems) are for monitoring automation system log data. Motivation for this study has been the 
growing number of cybersecurity threats faced by industrial automation systems and the disrup-
tive effects cyber-attacks can have on industries, vital infrastructure and the everyday life of peo-
ple. The research material for this study was gathered from various literary sources as well as 
automation engineering lectures, studies and personal work experience in the field of cybersecu-
rity. 
This thesis provides information for adding resilience for cybersecurity threats faced by indus-
trial automation systems. Growing cybersecurity threats and legislations such as the EU NIS Di-
rective emphasise the need for better situational awareness and management for cybersecurity 
related events. The findings of this thesis help improve the design of automation system log man-
agement and SIEM systems, both of which improve the systems capabilities for counteracting 
cybersecurity threats. 
The major finding of this study is that by default automation systems and SIEM systems are 
not highly compatible. Automation systems are complicated and highly tuned environments with 
special requirements for which SIEM systems are not originally designed. Integrating SIEM sys-
tems in a meaningful way with automation system would require major changes in both. 
The biggest issue is the log data itself. In automation systems, device logs stay in the devices, 
whereas SIEM needs that log data to be brought to a centralised location. Furthermore, the log 
data will most likely not be adequate for analysis as is, and it would require enriching. Implement-
ing modifications to correct these issues would be major transformational process to an automa-
tion system. 
From the automation engineer perspective the process and its reliability and availability are 
the most important aspects in relation to the functionality of the system. Therefore, their focus is 
on operational technology security. On the other hand, SIEM system focuses on information tech-
nology security and it will be an additional service that comes in use in rare special circumstances. 
For this reason, selling SIEM for automation systems is difficult.  
Furthermore, in automation systems, device logs are only inspected after an error situation, 
whereas SIEM aims to detect issues before they have a disruptive impact on the system. This 
mitigates damages and makes any countermeasures faster. However, systems such as SIEM 
would require monitoring which adds workload and the people monitoring SIEM would require 
expertise in both automation engineering and cybersecurity. Furthermore, monitoring the events 
in themselves is not enough, as the SIEM system has to be monitored as well in order to make 
sure it is working in the desired way. 
Automation systems are unique environments and adding SIEM requires extensive customi-
sation. Smart event detection systems use machine learning and AI to detect anomalies in a 
system’s activity rather than identifying markers of known malicious activity. This way they require 
less hands-on customisation and are more compatible with industrial control systems of various 
types and sizes. The future of cybersecurity management in automation systems is in implement-
ing smart detection systems and automated responses for better compatibility with operational 
technology environments and faster countermeasures. 
 
 
Keywords: automation, information security, cybersecurity, SIEM, event management, log 
 
The originality of this thesis has been checked using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service. 
  
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Juho Frigård: SIEM-järjestelmien käyttö automaatiojärjestelmien valvonnassa. 
Diplomityö, 75 sivua 
Tampereen yliopisto 
Automaatiotekniikka, DI 
Lokakuu 2019  
 
Tässä diplomityössä tutkitaan, kuinka turvallisuusinformaation ja –tapahtumien hallintajärjes-
telmät (SIEM, Security Information and Event Management) soveltuvat valvomaan automaatiojär-
jestelmien lokidataa. Teollisuusautomaatiojärjestelmiin kohdistuvien kyberturvallisuusuhkien 
kasvu sekä näiden aiheuttamat seuraukset teollisuudelle, infrastruktuurille ja ihmisten joka-päi-
väiseen elämään ovat olleet tämän työn keskeisinä motivaattoreina. Tutkielman aineisto on koottu 
kirjallisista lähteistä, automaatiotekniikan luennoilta, opinnoista ja työkokemuksesta kyberturval-
lisuusalalla. 
Tutkimus tarjoaa tietoa kyberturvallisuusuhkien ennaltaehkäisemiseen teollisuusautomaa-
tiojärjestelmissä. Kasvavat kyberturvauhat ja EU:n NIS direktiivi lisäävät tarvetta tarkan tilanne-
kuvan luomiselle ja kybertapahtumien valvonnalle yhteiskunnan tärkeiden palvelujen tuottajille. 
Tutkimustulokset tarjoavat apua automaatiojärjestelmien lokienhallinnan ja SIEM-järjestelmien 
suunnittelussa, joilla molemmilla tarjotaan suojaa kyberturvauhkia vastaan. 
Keskeisin tutkimushavainto on automaatiojärjestelmien ja SIEM-järjestelmien yhteensopimat-
tomuus. Automaatiojärjestelmät ovat monimutkaisia, pitkäikäisiä ja tarkoin säädettyjä toimintaym-
päristöjä, joiden erityisvaatimuksille SIEM-järjestelmiä ei ole alun perin suunniteltu. SIEM-järjes-
telmän integroiminen mielekkäästi automaatiojärjestelmään vaatisi suuria muutoksia molempiin 
järjestelmiin. 
Yksi suurimmista ongelmista on lokidatan siirtäminen laitteelta toiselle. Automaatiojärjestel-
missä laitteiden lokit jäävät laitteiden muisteihin, kun SIEM-järjestelmä tarvitsisi niiden tuontia 
keskitettyyn sijaintiin. Laitteiden tuottama lokidata ei myöskään todennäköisesti sovellu sellaise-
naan, jotta SIEM-järjestelmillä pystyisi tekemään tilannekuvatarkoituksiin riittävää analyysia. Lo-
kidata pitäisi rikastaa esimerkiksi vähintään laitteen sijaintitiedolla. Tällaisten muutosten tekemi-
nen vaatii suuria muutoksia automaatiojärjestelmiin. 
Automaatioinsinöörille automaatiojärjestelmässä tärkeintä on itse prosessi sekä tämän luotet-
tavuus ja saatavuus. Tästä näkökulmasta SIEM-järjestelmä olisi lisäpalvelu, josta on hyötyä vain 
harvinaisissa erikoistilanteissa. Tästä syystä SIEM-järjestelmien myynti automaatiojärjestelmiin 
on vaikeaa. Automaatiojärjestelmissä lokeja tarkastellaan vain, kun jokin laite vaikuttaa toimivan 
väärin, mutta SIEM-järjestelmillä on tarkoitus havaita ongelmat ennen suuria vaikutuksia kohde-
järjestelmälle. Etukäteistoimenpiteillä voidaan vähentää seurauksien vaikutuksia ja lyhentää vas-
tatoimien vasteaikaa. SIEM-järjestelmät kuitenkin tarvitsevat valvontaa, mikä lisää työtaakka, ja 
valvontaa suorittavilta henkilöiltä vaaditaan asiantuntijuutta sekä automaatiotekniikasta että ky-
berturvallisuudesta. Lisäksi pelkkä tapahtumien valvonta ei riitä vaan koko SIEM-järjestelmää täy-
tyy valvoa ja kehittää jatkuvasti, jotta se toimisi halutulla tavalla. 
Automaatiojärjestelmät ovat ainutlaatuisia ympäristöjä ja SIEM järjestelmän lisääminen vaatii 
laajaa räätälöintiä. Älykkäät tapahtumien havaitsemisjärjestelmät käyttävät koneoppimista ja te-
koälyä tunnistamaan poikkeavia toimintoja järjestelmässä sen sijaan, että ne yrittäisivät tunnistaa 
tunnettuja haitallisia ohjelmia tai hyökkäyksiä. Tällä tavalla ne vaativat vähemmän käytännön mu-
kauttamista ja ovat paremmin yhteensopivia erityyppisten ja erikokoisten automaatiojärjestelmien 
kanssa. Automaatiojärjestelmien kyberturvallisuuden hallinnan tulevaisuus onkin älykkäiden ha-
vainnointijärjestelmien ja automatisoitujen vastatoimien teknologioissa. Niillä saadaan aikaan pa-
rempi yhteensopivuus teollisten automaatiojärjestelmien kanssa ja niiden avulla voidaan toteutet-
tua nopeampia vastatoimenpiteitä. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Automation systems are everywhere. Their functions range from controlling large indus-
trial processes to autonomous vehicles and all the way to managing electronic devices 
in people’s homes. They are also a key part in maintaining vital infrastructure on a global 
scale. Countries, businesses and individual people rely on these systems to work. One 
growing threat in the field of automation and technology in general is cybersecurity. 
In 2019, Kaspersky Lab published their study on the threat landscape for industrial au-
tomation systems. Major finding in the study was that in 2018 as much as 47,2 % of 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) contained malicious objects. In the previous year this 
number was 44,0 %. Malicious objects were categorised into multiple different categories 
most prevalent of which were Trojans, malicious scripts, worms, web miners and mali-
cious link files. (Kaspersky Lab, 2019) 
 
Figure 1.  Kaspersky Lab’s ICS CERT research results showing the percentage of 
ICS computers infected with malicious software. (Kaspersky Lab, 2019) 
Figure 1 is Kaspersky Lab’s ICS CERT research results concerning the amount of ICS 
computers being affected by malicious software worldwide. Countries with the highest 
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percentages were Vietnam, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. In Vietnam, as much 
as 70,0 % of ICS computers were infected. (Kaspersky Lab, 2019) 
This level of infection can have major disruptive effects on not only business but also 
individual people and society in general as automation systems with ICSs control vital 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the number of infected ICS computers in industrial systems 
is growing every year. (Kaspersky Lab, 2019) 
The most widely used malware found in the Kaspersky Lab’s study was Trojans. These 
are pieces of malicious software, which are distributed inside other programs or email 
attachments. They deceive the user into trusting the software and once the program is 
used or the email attachment is opened, the Trojan’s malicious code will be executed. 
Important aspect in handling cybersecurity threats is situational awareness. This involves 
monitoring events in the system. Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
system is a tool specially designed for detecting, monitoring and categorising events 
based on logged data. These SIEM systems allow people to follow the state of a system 
they are monitoring and through that react to possible threats or other anomalies.  
SIEM relies on centralised log management and constant monitoring. Both of these make 
it challenging to integrate SIEM systems to automation systems. Challenges also include 
resources, automation engineers’ interests and added workload that SIEM will inevitably 
require during the entire automation systems lifecycle as cybersecurity is not a goal but 
a continuous process. 
Industrial and automation systems can also have legislative obligations concerning cy-
bersecurity. In August 2016, the EU NIS Directive, that is the first EU-wide directive on 
cybersecurity, entered into force. The directive aims to improve overall level of cyberse-
curity in the EU. Improvements are achieved by ensuring that member states enhance 
their preparedness for cybersecurity threats and co-operate with other states. In addition, 
the directive aims to establish a culture of security across sectors that are vital for our 
economy and society and rely heavily on Information and Communications Technologies 
(ICT), such as energy, transport, water, banking, financial market infrastructures, 
healthcare and digital infrastructure. (EU: Cybersecurity & Digital Privacy Policy (Unit 
H.2), 2019) 
The NIS Directive obliges business, that the member state has identified as providers of 
essential services, to take appropriate countermeasures and notify the proper authorities 
of any serious cybersecurity incidents. SIEM is a tool for monitoring such incidents and 
an effective solution for monitoring cybersecurity in large systems. As some of these vital 
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service providers or infrastructures rely on automation systems to function, SIEM is an 
alternative for providing monitoring, analysis and auditing for these environments.  
This thesis studies the usability of SIEM systems in monitoring automation systems.  
SIEM is widely used in monitoring various information technology systems, however, 
automation systems impose their own requirements that SIEM systems will have to fulfil. 
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2. THESIS STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is a literary study. Information is gathered from various literary sources, au-
tomation engineering lectures, studies and work experience. The automation systems 
this thesis concerns, are large process automation system used in industry and infra-
structure. Physical safety related automation systems are not covered in this thesis. 
The purpose of this thesis is to study how well SIEM systems would perform in monitoring 
automation systems and how SIEM systems should operate when monitoring these au-
tomation systems. Therefore, the topic of this thesis is Security Information and Event 
Management Systems Monitoring Automation Systems. 
Security information is all the information relating to the systems resilience against un-
desired effects from external or internal sources. External sources could be malware or 
physical threats such as vandalism, whereas internal sources can be malfunctioning 
components or operator errors. 
Security Events are observable occurrences that can be categorised relating to the se-
curity of the system. Events can be initiated by components, process or human operators 
and they do not have to be malicious in nature. Example of a security event would be 
login to a service. 
The management part relates to handling security information and events. Major part in 
handling this information is the processing of the input data. Through analysis, the actual 
information is gathered from data, as raw log data does not qualify as information on its 
own. Having tools that have capabilities for automated processing and analysis of data 
will automate this process. 
Automation systems are used to control physical systems automatically. This thesis con-
cerns process automation systems that used to control industrial processes and safety 
related systems and smaller automation systems are omitted.  
All process automation systems require monitoring. Monitoring is done by collecting data 
from the process as well as the devices controlling the process and using this data in 
forming a situational image of the system. The purpose of monitoring is to ensure the 
system is functioning within the desired parameters. 
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2.1 Sources 
Sources for this thesis are mainly electronic sources. The topic is related to automation, 
information technology and cybersecurity. The information concerning these topics 
changes fast and electronic sources seemed provide the most up to date information. 
There is also a wide range of older sources concerning automation systems and indus-
trial control systems that offer accurate and still relevant information. In addition to elec-
tronic and other literary source, the faculty of Automation Engineering in Tampere Uni-
versity provided information about automation systems and their log handling. Infor-
mation was also attained from automation engineering studies and work experience from 
the field of cybersecurity. 
When gathering information from electronic sources, it was important to identify the type 
of the source. In the field cybersecurity, one can find multiple different source types from 
scholar papers to blog texts, and even though blog texts could provide a lot of practical 
advice on SIEM and cybersecurity matters, the information they gave had to be checked 
from other sources if possible. 
2.2 Process 
The process of making this thesis started from the inception of the topic. The topic con-
cerns handling log data in automation systems, which relates to cybersecurity and the 
growing threat this imposes to automation systems. The research done for this thesis 
can offer information that helps in building systems that are more resilient to cybersecu-
rity threats. 
After deciding the topic, started the process of gathering information and refining the 
area of focus for the thesis. The foundation of this thesis is formed by compiling special 
requirements that automation systems possess, and then analysing how well would 
SIEM systems be able to function in accordance to these special requirements. 
2.3 Structure 
This thesis starts with theoretical background section in chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 
covers SIEM systems. It describes how SIEM systems are used, who uses them and 
what the overall purpose of these systems is. Chapter 4 in turn, provides theoretical 
background on automation systems and the different industrial system levels from enter-
prise levels to field device levels. This provides more information on the devices that 
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produce the actual information that is logged and monitored. Chapter 4 also covers spe-
cial requirements for automation system software and log management and event han-
dling. 
In conjunction with chapter 4, chapters 5, 6 and 7 form the basis of the analysis. Chapter 
5 covers log data in automation systems and chapter 6 provides information on cyber-
security in automation systems. This includes pre-existing solutions for event manage-
ment in industrial control systems. Chapter 7, on the other hand, is an example of how 
SIEM parsers are implemented in practise. This offers additional perspective into what 
parser development is like and what steps must be taken to develop parsers. Parsers 
are a key part in analysing log data with SIEM systems. 
Chapter 8 is the analysis of how well SIEM systems would function under the require-
ments and challenges automation systems impose on them. This chapter also provides 
practical solutions for integrating SIEM systems for industrial automation systems in or-
der to achieve the best possible results from both automation system and SIEM system 
perspectives. 
Finally, chapter 9 is the conclusion chapter of this thesis. It is a summary of the results 
of the analysis conducted in chapter 8. It also gives information on the future of SIEM 
and automation as well as future areas of research in the aforementioned topics. 
7 
 
 
3. SECURITY INFORMATION AND EVENT MAN-
AGEMENT SYSTEMS 
The term Security Information and Event Management Systems (SIEM) was first intro-
duced by Mark Nicolett and Amrit Williams from Gartner Analysts in 2005. They recog-
nised that there were so-called Security Event Management (SEM) and Security Infor-
mation Management (SIM) tools on the market, the former of which meant real-time anal-
ysis of events to support incident response, and the latter was for the long-term storage 
of information security data and historical analysis. In the past, there were suppliers who 
focused on either SEM or SIM. However, there was an increasing desire from the market 
to have them both working in unison. Thus, in 2004 these new combinations of SEM and 
SIM started to appear on the market. (Williams, 2007) 
The main purpose of SIEM is to detect security related activity. This is achieved by col-
lecting data from event sources, parsing the incoming data, categorising the event and 
storing all the relevant data. The stored data forms a baseline for activities in the system 
and allows SIEM to detect and inform the operator of any possible security threats or 
other security related events that are worth noting. SIEM can detect security threats by 
using indicators in individual events to identify specific activity or correlation rules to de-
tect activities from a collection of individual events. An example of using correlation rules 
is to detect when somebody is logging into a service multiple times with the wrong pass-
word. Activity such as that may be the sign of a brute force attack trying to find a pass-
word to gain an access to the system. 
SIEM is an event analysis tool. Events in this case are forms of activity that occur in the 
system that is being monitored. SIEM receives or fetches data from data sources, parses 
the information, perform analysis and displays the relevant information to the person 
monitoring the system. The analysis concerns reading input data, parsing out relevant 
data and making observations based on rules in the SIEM system. The rules can be pre-
programmed or in more sophisticated SIEM systems they can also be formed through a 
machine learning process. In machine learning, the system forms rules by experience 
rather than being programmed by a human.  Figure 2 presents the user interface for 
Micro Focuses SIEM product Sentinel. 
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Figure 2. Micro Focus’ SIEM product Sentinel’s user interface where different 
events are presented as a list. 
In figure 2, all the events are presented as a list and they are organised based on 
timestamps. In all of the events, there is an event name, IP addresses of both the source 
of the message and the target of the message. Port numbers are included for both source 
and target services. The events have also taxonomy definitions, which categorise the 
events. Categories are for instance login, logout, password changed, malware, and da-
tabase query. 
3.1 Log Data Inputs 
SIEM systems take event data in various formats through various sources. Sources may 
include for example: 
1. log files, 
2. syslog messages, 
3. SQL databases and 
4. Windows events 
Log Files are either unstructured or structured lists of log events in a file. It can be, for 
instance, a comma-separated values (CSV) file where individual log fields are separated 
by a comma or another character. Events are separated on separate lines and usually 
in a way which a single event occupies one line. However, it is possible that one event 
is split into multiple lines in which case the event has to be constructed from the different 
lines. 
When using syslog, messages are sent from logging devices to a server that stores these 
messages. Syslog server can receive messages from multiple devices at once and they 
can relay all the gathered information forward for data parsing and event detection pur-
poses. Figure 3 illustrates the function of syslog logging. 
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Figure 3. Illustrative picture of how syslog message are send from the end devices 
to a syslog server and to administrators who check the event data. (Leskiw, 
2018) 
In figure 3, the network devices represent the devices from which the syslog messages 
originate. They send messages to the syslog server, which stores the information and 
then sends it to the administrator. Between the device and the syslog server, there can 
be other servers or databases that store the messages before sending them to the syslog 
server. The administrator can be an actual person going through the data by hand or it 
can be an automated program that parses the information, which makes interpreting the 
messages easier. 
In some cases, it might be useful to implement event filters into syslog servers. Event 
filters filter out irrelevant messages in order to automate and simplify the process of in-
terpreting the data. This can be useful if a SIEM system is not used in conjunction with 
the syslog server. (Leskiw, 2018) 
Syslog messages can vary widely depending on the device sending the messages. How-
ever, most syslog messages comply with a specific format and the messages are com-
prised of IP addresses, timestamps and the actual event information. Below is an exam-
ple of a syslog message. 
<35> 2019-01-01T09:00:00.000 130.230.252.62 applicationID[12345]: 
2019-01-01T08:59:59.000 130.230.137.61 WARNING message="Failed 
login by user 'admin'"  
The messages begins with a priority number that is encased in angle brackets. The pri-
ority number is formed by multiplying the facility number by eight and then adding the 
severity to that result. The facility number in turn tells what kind of message it is. For 
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instance, the example message is an authentication message, as it is a failed login warn-
ing, so it would have a facility code of four. With a severity value of three, the priority 
number would be in this case 35. 
After the priority number, there is the timestamp of the event. This timestamp is from the 
device that sent the message and it describes the accurate time when the event oc-
curred. Accurate timestamps are integral to building an image of the events in the system 
as they reveal information on the sequence of the events. The timestamp is followed by 
an IP address or a host name. This informs what device sent the syslog message. How-
ever, in some cases the IP address can change during transmission, as IP addresses 
are not static. 
The last piece of information before the colon is the application ID. The application ID is 
not formally part of the header, but it is most often included. This ID tells from what ap-
plication the syslog message originates. The application ID can be used to identify the 
format of the message and how the message is supposed to be parsed.  
The actual content of the syslog message comes after the application ID and that con-
tains the event data. The format of event data can vary and is related to the device and 
the event itself. It may contain the IP address of the logging device, severity information, 
timestamp of the event and an actual plaintext explanation of the event. In the example 
event, the message begins with a timestamp followed by an IP address. Then there is a 
value WARNING which is information concerning the type and severity of the message. 
Lastly, there is a plaintext message field that explains that this event is a failed login by 
the user admin. 
Syslog has its faults. The syslog format does not concern the message content and this 
means that every single log source might require its own parser. Originally, syslog used 
UDP to transfer messages and UDP is connectionless protocol. As a result, it is possible 
to lose packets due to network congestion or packet loss. Now syslog messages also 
use TCP and TLS. The latter of which is used for sending encrypted syslog messages. 
Syslog messages do not have any authentication so it is difficult to verify where the mes-
sages are coming from. This in turn makes it possible to forge messages, which leaves 
the system open for replay attacks. (Leskiw, 2018) Replay attack means that a malicious 
party intercepts a message or multiple messages and uses those messages to forge 
events by sending them to SIEM later. 
Syslog is preinstalled into many Unix-based operating systems. Windows on the other 
hand uses its own logging format: Windows Event logs. Windows event logs are formed 
by actions from the operator of the machine or some internal process and they are used 
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for security management as well as debugging issues. The logs are all in the same for-
mat making automated parsing more simple and the entire analysis process more 
streamlined and faster. (Gough & Porter, 2007; Rouse, 2018) 
In contrast to syslog messages, SIEM can also fetch event information from databases. 
In this case, data is stored into a database from which they are collected and parsed by 
SIEM. Whereas with syslog the messages were specifically sent to SIEM, in this case 
SIEM has to query them actively from an external data storage. When using databases, 
there is no format for how the data is stored or what kind of data there is in the first place. 
Similarly to syslog, this means that SIEM might need multiple parsers to parse the data. 
This can be aided by designing databases smartly so that they utilise the same fields 
regardless of where and in what format the information arrives to the database. 
3.2 Event Data Parsing and Normalisation 
Regardless of where the event information is coming from, the data has to be parsed 
before SIEM can present the data in a human readable form or perform any analysis of 
the events. Parsing means that all the relevant values are extracted from the raw data 
that comes from the logging device and are stored in the appropriate data models in 
SIEM. This latter part is called normalisation. The analysis comes from interpreting the 
data, identifying patterns and alerting of possible threats. This analysis requires normal-
isation, as without it SIEM would not be able to ably any logic into the analysis. 
The format of the log message plays huge part in this as device manufactures have their 
own formats in use. As a result, most log formats will require their own parsers. If a SIEM 
system collects logs from a multitude of devices, making parser for each of them can be 
time consuming or even unfeasible. In addition, syslog messages may cause more is-
sues as syslog may send a single event as multiple messages. This results in having to 
buffer messages until all the messages relevant to one event have been received. These 
single messages might not even be received in sequence as other syslog messages 
might be received in between them. Before parsing can begin, all messages relating to 
a single event must be received and identifying which messages relate to which event 
might be difficult. 
Some SIEM products require that every single parser be programmed manually. The 
parser developer will write the code for the parsing logic and build the program to form a 
parser plugin. This plugin is then installed to the SIEM system where it can be tested and 
taken into use. This type of parser development requires knowledge of programming, 
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software development and testing. Therefore, it might be outsourced to companies that 
offer parser development as a service. 
Some SIEM products offer more high-level parser development tools. With these tools, 
parsers are built from pre-programmed widgets on a graphical user interface. Unlike 
when programming parsers by hand, this might not require as much knowledge or train-
ing in software development. The information can also be extracted from the log data by 
the use of regular expressions that identify regular patterns in the data. 
When implementing SIEM, it is vital that parsers are developed properly. Improper 
parsers might leave out integral information, misplace information into the wrong fields 
or even lose entire events. All of these on their own could cause event correlation detec-
tion to work incorrectly. This will in turn add workload to administrators who are monitor-
ing the events. In the event that a possible threat is found, the administrators will have 
to find all of the required information by themselves, which is time consuming and re-
quires a lot of resources. This also means that the administrators will have less time react 
to events and to decide the importance and severity of the threat. These are all important 
factors when it comes to resilience and resistance to security issues. 
3.3 Event Correlation Detection 
One of the key features of SIEM systems is event correlation detection. In event corre-
lation detection, log data is analysed in order to identify relationships between multiple 
events by recognising patterns in the data. For example, if from a particular IP address 
someone is trying to login to a system with different username and password combina-
tions a certain amount of times, it may signal a malicious attempt to access peoples’ 
accounts or the system in general. Through event correlation, these types of activities 
can be recognised and the system administrators would be notified of the suspicious 
activity. (Zhang, 2018) 
Malicious activity might not consist of only one type of activity. In situations like that, 
correlation rules in SIEM system have to be able to build situational awareness from a 
variety of events. A few failed logins do not usually mean that someone is attacking the 
system but if they accompanied by a port scan originating from the same IP address, 
you might be dealing with an attack. (Zhang, 2018) 
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Figure 4.  Too many failed logins triggered a correlation rule in Sentinel. 
Figure 4 depicts an alarm caused by too many failed logins to a system. SIEM uses 
taxonomy definitions to detect failed logins and tracks the source IP and initiator 
username to determine whether they originate from the same source. If the number of 
failed logins exceed the appropriate limit set by the system administrator, SIEM system 
will automatically initiate an alarm event signifying potential malicious activity to the op-
erator monitoring the SIEM system.  
Event correlation detection can also be used to find root causes to incidents. For in-
stance, in a situation where in a complex system hundreds of alarms are sounded con-
veying that servers and related services are no longer reachable. Event correlation tools 
can analyse the data in order to determine the root cause allowing the IT department to 
focus on implementing a solution rather than spending valuable time trying to pinpoint 
the cause. In an alarm situation, thousands or millions of events can be generated in just 
a short period. These events can range from informational to critical. While a good ana-
lyst can identify the root cause of failures, this type of knowledge is expensive to obtain. 
Event correlation technology was designed to automate and register interrelations be-
tween ongoing events in a more cost-effective manner. (Zhang, 2018) 
Benefits of event correlation detection: 
1. Real time threat visibility. Active event correlation and analysis can help IT de-
partments to detect threats in real time. Failures, security breaches, and opera-
tional issues all affect the system. 
2. Vigilance of network safety. The network can be monitored at all times. In addi-
tion, impact failures can be identified and remedied. 
3. Reduces operational costs. Event correlation tools automate processes such as 
the analysis of large workflows to reduce the number of relevant alerts. 
3.4 Security Monitoring 
The effectiveness of SIEM is connected to security monitoring. SIEM performs the auto-
mated analysis of event data and presents analysed information to the operators who 
might be system administrators, security personnel, IT personnel or employees of secu-
rity operations centres who are tasked with monitoring the state of a system. SIEM’s 
purpose is to parse, analyse and normalise the incoming data in such a way that requires 
little manual analysis but provides the user as much information as they need to form an 
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accurate situational image of the system and perform any required countermeasures or 
follow-up actions to events. 
SIEMs can detect events in large data sets. They can detect events that might otherwise 
stay hidden if the data was monitored purely by a human, as SIEM is better than humans 
are at detecting small anomalies in large samples of data. Furthermore, with the use of 
correlation rules, SIEM can detect suspicious activity by connecting a larger number of 
events, which is also something that is difficult for humans to do. SIEMs can be used to 
detect activities such as: 
1. denial of service attacks, 
2. brute force attacks, 
3. suspicious queries, 
4. port scans, 
5. malware and 
6. privilege escalation attempts. 
From these, malware is one the most significant threat to industrial systems from the 
perspective of automation systems. In 2018, as much as 47,2 % of industrial control 
systems were infected with malware. Most common piece of malware was Trojans, which 
were found in 27,1 % of industrial control system computers. (Kaspersky Lab, 2019)  
SIEM systems have some correlation rules built into them but end users can also create 
their own. Thus, correlation rules can be tailored to the specific application in order to 
provide analysis that is more accurate. When there is less need for manual analysis, 
countermeasures to error situations can be faster and more precise. This reduces dam-
age caused to the system and the data in the system. 
SIEM also provides an audit trail and forensic capabilities. SIEM can be used to trace an 
attack as it can collect data from multiple data sources and act as journal for all activity 
in the system. However, the danger is that business deploy SIEM to fulfil a legislative 
mandate to monitor and audit activity in a system without implementing it in a meaningful 
way. In these types of cases, SIEM is not configured properly and it might not serve its 
purpose. In the worst-case scenario, SIEM can hide important information, as the people 
responsible of monitoring the system rely on SIEM to provide them with all the necessary 
information. A poorly configured SIEM might not alert the monitors of noteworthy events 
and these events will stay hidden from the monitors. When implementing SIEM, it is 
important to focus on the purpose of the SIEM and configure it in a way that it provides 
a meaningful function for the whole target system. 
Monitoring can be done in a Security Operations Centre (SOC). SOC is a centralised 
facility where information security professionals both monitor and implement counter-
measures to threats for a client organisation. SOC and SIEM are a part of service model 
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called security as service, in which information security management is outsourced to a 
specialist organisation. In addition, security as service offers up-to-date tools that are 
instantly available to use and the client organisations funds are directed towards actual 
security measures rather than buying software, acquiring licenses and training staff. Or-
ganisations that produce security as service are known as Managed Security Service 
Providers (MSSP). (Brook, 2018) 
3.5 Benefits for Business 
Excluding the development stage, handling event data can be divided roughly into three 
categories: automated processing of data, manual – human performed – analysis of the 
data and required countermeasures. In order to make this process more efficient, the 
automated processing should take the majority of the data analysis away from the human 
administrator or the person monitoring event data. This is the very purpose for which 
SIEM was designed. (Vesamäki, 2016) 
Detecting anomalies and filtering relevant data from a large stream of events is a time 
consuming job that requires resources and affects businesses’ resilience to information 
security threats. Detecting patterns and performing correlation detection would be very 
difficult if not impossible with large amounts of event data. SIEM takes away a lot of the 
workload from the administrators by automating this process. 
SIEM improves reaction times to events, cuts down production shortages and redirects 
resources to understanding better the root causes of incidents and repairing them. SIEM 
also brings visibility to the organisation’s operations and state. Even by preventing one 
cybersecurity breach, SIEM can make the entire investment financially profitable, as the 
costs of recuperation go down and the company might gain an advantage in the market 
in relation to its competitors. (Vesamäki, 2016). However, SIEM and SOC are expensive 
to deploy and maintain, so normally the value of these systems and services rely on 
continuous operations and long-time benefits. 
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4. AUTOMATION SYSTEMS 
Automation systems can be single logic devices or factory sized systems intended to 
control the entire manufacturing process of the factory. In this thesis, the term automation 
system specifically refers to a process automation system. Process automation is used 
to improve the efficiency of the manufacturing process and improve the quality of the end 
result, which in turn improves the company’s position in the market place. Automation is 
also used commonly to do dangerous or monotonous tasks. 
4.1 Different Device Levels 
Industrial automation systems can be divided into different levels based on the function-
ality of the devices. Common levels are control room level, cross-connection level and 
field level. Figure 5 illustrates these levels. 
 
Figure 5.  Common different levels in automation systems. (Asp, et al., 2019) 
In figure 5, measurement data flows from the bottom level (field level) to the top level 
(control room level). Control input data in turn flows from top to bottom. However, in 
modern industrial automation systems, based on Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and 
Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA) and the direct communication and administration 
of field devices, the separation of these levels can be less clear (Bergweiler, 2016). 
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Cyber-Physical Systems are the amalgamations of computational and physical pro-
cesses, where embedded computers and networks monitor and control physical pro-
cesses (Lee, 2008). In Service-Oriented Architectures, the service and the product have 
a loose coupling. This means the service is less dependent on the product produced and 
it relies on offering a certain type of service through which the desired result is achieved. 
(He, 2003) 
4.1.1 Field Level 
Field devices are electronic devices that are located at the field level, the lowest level in 
the hierarchical level model for automation. This level is closest to the actual process. 
Sensors, actuators and general field devices are located here. Field devices are associ-
ated with sensors that detect the data of the measuring points and send the control data 
to the actuators. Field devices continuously supply measured data for process control 
and receive control data for the actuators. (Bergweiler, 2016) 
Automation systems include vast numbers of field devices. A single system can have 
thousands of measuring devices also, known as measuring points, each of which, for 
instance, could send one measurement every second. This results in large amounts of 
data that have to be transferred via the communication network. 
4.1.2 Cross-Connection Level 
The cross-connection level is comprised of various automation controllers and connect-
ing fieldbuses. This is also the level in which factory level Ethernet would reside as is 
shown in figure 5. Controllers’ function is to gather measurement data and give new 
control inputs to field devices. (Mraz, 2017) 
One very widely used controller type in modern factories are Programmable Logic Con-
trollers (PLC). PLCs are units that are made from various components such as central 
processing units, both analogue and digital inputs and outputs and communication mod-
ules. Advantage of using PLCs is that they allow automation engineers program control 
functions or strategies that drive the automation process. (Mraz, 2017) 
4.1.3 Control Room Level 
The control room level, sometimes referred as the supervisory level, is the level furthest 
from the actual process. This is where automatic devices and monitoring systems aid the 
control and adjustment functions, with the help of Human Machine Interfaces (HMI), dis-
tribution control systems and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices. 
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These are used to monitor process parameters and measurements, set control inputs 
for the process, store measurement data and set machine start and shutdowns. (Mraz, 
2017) 
Control room level devices might have access to the Internet. As a result, control room 
level is the only level with a connection to the outside of the system. This creates a 
vulnerability to the whole system as it might act as an entry point for cybersecurity 
threats. To counter act this issue, devices that have access to the Internet should always 
be separated from any devices that control the process or the system overall by the use 
of a security zone (Crevatin, et al., 2005). For high security requirements, separating the 
control room network from the Internet is done with a demilitarized zone (DMZ), where 
access servers and other servers that are to be accessible from the external network are 
placed. The DMZ is isolated from both the office network and the external network by 
firewalls. These firewalls are configured to allow access from the Internet only to selected 
servers. To help the DMZ to detect anomalies it can be connected to an intrusion detec-
tion system that monitors network traffic and uses correlation rules to detect malicious 
events. (Crevatin, et al., 2005) 
4.1.4 ISA-95 System Level Classification 
ISA-95 (ANSI/ISA-95) is an international standard for developing an automated interface 
between enterprise and control systems. The standard is used by manufacturers in au-
tomated batch, continuous and repetitive processes and its main purposes is to establish 
a common terminology and understanding between suppliers and manufacturers. It 
helps to provide a consistent model for operations and makes the functionality of appli-
cations more clear. (Castilla, et al., 2011; Åkerman, 2016) 
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Figure 6.  ISA-95 standards multilevel hierarchy for industrial enterprises from level 
0 to level 4 (Åkerman, 2016). 
Figure 6 shows the different hierarchical levels of the ISA-95 standard. ISA-95 divides 
the industrial enterprises to five levels. The first level, commonly referred as level zero is 
very similar to the field level described in chapter 4.1.1. It contains field devices and the 
communication in this level comprises of measurement data, control input signals and 
alarms. The timeframe devices in this level are concerned with is measured in microsec-
onds and milliseconds. Levels 1 and 2 are also analogous to the cross-connection and 
control room levels in chapters 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. Figure 6 shows, however, that level one’s 
timeframe is measured in seconds and level two’s timeframe is measured in minutes. 
(Castilla, et al., 2011; Zhang, 2018) 
ISA-95 introduces levels 3 and 4. Level 3 is the Manufacturing Operations Management 
level and level 4 is the Business planning and logistic level. Level 3 is responsible for the 
supervision of the manufacturing process on the whole from the field level to the control 
room level. Level 4, on the other hand, is also known as the Enterprise level that over-
sees the functioning of the enterprise and comprises of superior management policies of 
the enterprise. It is responsible for the development and operations of the enterprise 
including all of its plants and respective production lines. Levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 create the 
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industrial zone and level 4 is called the enterprise zone.  (Castilla, et al., 2011; Didier, et 
al., 2019) 
Figure 6 also illustrates the communication technologies on the different levels. Levels 
from 0 to 2 use field networks to communicate and levels 3 to 4 use IP networks. IP 
networks refer to communications through Ethernet or Internet. 
4.2 Manufacturing Execution Systems and Operations Manage-
ment 
Manufacturing Execution System (MES) is an integrated system of a collection of pro-
cess control related functions. This can mean a collection of separate pieces of software 
that collect data from the process and control the production, or it could be single piece 
of software that handles all the necessary data collection and device control. Typical task 
for MES is automated data collection from the process, tracing manufacturing history of 
the product, handing work instructions and other documentation and managing mainte-
nance and quality control information. Furthermore, MES acts a real time link between 
the different levels in automation processes. It transfers data from the process to the 
control room level and production orders and situation queries from the upper levels to 
the field device levels. (Hästbacka & Kuikka, 2017) 
Manufacturing Operations Management (MOM) on the other hand is a process that is 
used to observe and evaluate the entire manufacturing process in order to optimise its 
efficiency. MES and MOM are similar in many ways. However, MOM is more focused on 
the observation of the operational process where as MES is more concerned with indi-
vidual systems and software. (Hästbacka & Kuikka, 2017) 
4.3 System Reliability 
One of the most important aspects of automation systems is reliability. Industrial auto-
mation systems can operate for years without shutdowns and conditions on the field 
device level are often challenging. Dust, heat and chemicals impose problems for elec-
tronic devices, execution of the process is depended on functionality of the controllers 
and data transfer and every shutdown is expensive. Shutting down an industrial process 
can cost up to 100 000 dollars an hour (Armstrong, 2016).  
Systems reliability can be improved in many ways. Some improvements come from the 
hardware devices and their software and some come from control software. The system 
can have for instance duplicate devices or fieldbuses so that when the primary device 
stops working all operation can be transferred to the secondary device. Systems could 
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use self-diagnostic tools to detect possible problems and find root causes for them. Also, 
when designing the system, paying attention to having proper alarm systems that indi-
cate when problems occur and designing the entire system in a way that problems in 
one part of the factory influence the other parts as little as possible. 
4.4 Distributed Automation Systems 
Process automation systems are typically Distributed Control Systems (DCS). DCS typ-
ically consists of process control stations, monitoring stations, fieldbuses, programmable 
logic controllers (PLC) and data management stations. These data management stations 
might not exist in small systems. (ABB, 2007) 
 
Figure 7.  Block diagram of a simplified automation system. 
Figure 7 shows a simplified block diagram of a general automation system. Automation 
systems collect measurement data from the process. This is shown in the process and 
measurement blocks in figure 7. Based on the measurements, the system calculates the 
required control inputs for controllers. Controllers are located in the control block in figure 
7. This is called a feedback loop. The measurements can also be displayed to system 
monitors in the control room from where human operators can change inputs if needed. 
Overall, the purpose of the measurements is to help create a good understanding of the 
state of the process so that it can be improved. The quality of the data is an important 
factor in achieving this. (ABB, 2007) 
Process control’s real time database is distributed by taking process control stations or 
process control systems close to the process. In distributed control systems, process 
control stations are capable of handling measurement data, calculating control inputs 
and issuing new input for controllers. By doing this, the data does not have to be sent to 
a central computer and back for the calculations. Furthermore, automation systems can 
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be built in accordance to the process layout. Taking process I/O units close to the pro-
cess helps in saving resources when it comes to cables as the distance between the 
processes and processing units is short. (ABB, 2007) 
4.5 Requirements and Challenges of Automation Systems 
Process automation system is a challenging environment for both hardware and soft-
ware. It imposes special requirements for all devices, connectors and the logic that drives 
the system and even short downtimes can be expensive. Therefore, implementing new 
features into an automation system is a long and costly process where every single detail 
is looked at with high precision. For SIEM to be included in an automation system, it must 
be able to comply with the special conditions and requirements. 
One major challenge for implementing SIEM in an automation system is that to an auto-
mation engineer information security is an additional service. The process itself is the 
main purpose and main function of the entire system. Additional services require addi-
tional resources and investments, and if they do not relate directly to the process, justi-
fying them might prove difficult, as efficiency and reliability of the process are the main 
aspects that engineers are concerned with in an automation system. All additional ser-
vices and functionality should be justified through these aspects. 
4.5.1 Design Phase 
When adding functionality to an automation system, the planning stage can be expensive 
compared to the cost of the products added to the system. In automation systems, re-
placing single wires can be costly even though the wires themselves might be inexpen-
sive. Planning involves multiple steps to ensure that the added functionality or devices 
do not disturb the process, and that the modifications would yield the best possible re-
sults. 
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Figure 8.  Life cycle model for process control system. (ServicesParis, 2010) 
Figure 8 shows a model of a process automation system’s development and modification 
life cycle. The left cascade in the model describes the design phase, the middle part is 
the building phase and the right cascade is the verification stage. The planning stage is 
comprised of multiple phases from quality planning to design review. 
Every modification to the system requires an extensive inquiry to the effects of the mod-
ification. Changing one component in one place might influence other components else-
where and understanding this is vital. Mistakes are usually cheapest to fix in the planning 
phase, however, mistakes that that are caused by inadequate planning and are fixed 
later on in the life cycle of the modification process are often much more expensive. 
Configuration changes in the field device level cause a medium risk while changes in the 
cross-connection level cause a higher risk, as that is the place where a lot of the control 
software and logic is housed (Goss, 2010). 
Furthermore, when choosing new components to be added, deciding between a multi-
tude of vendors and different specifications of the component is not a trivial process. The 
field of automation is full of product manufactures, which offer their own versions of com-
ponents, software or protocols. Manufacturers might also supply different lifecycle ser-
vices such as maintenance and log handling. 
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4.5.2 Performance and Reliability Requirements 
One of the more important factors in automation is the performance of the system. The 
end product or purpose of an automation system, be that an actual manufactured product 
or an end result of a function that the system provides, is dependent on the performance 
of the system. Issues in performance can have a negative economic, quality and safety 
implications, so performance to an automation engineer is perhaps the most important 
factor in an automation system. 
Automation systems contain controllers that require certain performance capabilities in 
order to control devices with the precision required. During a regulatory task, automation 
system must measure output of the system or part of a system, calculate the feedback 
loop value from the measurement and the input of the device and give a new control 
input to the system on a constant cycle. The feedback loop can be seen in figure 7. 
Performance capabilities are an important factor in automation system reliability. Relia-
bility describes the probability of the system to function as desired and disruptions in 
performance will have an effect in system reliability. As reliability is one of the important 
factors from the perspective of an automation engineer, this puts more emphasis on the 
system’s performance requirements. 
4.5.3 Software Requirements 
Software in automation system has to operate within certain real-time requirements. 
Real-time requirements can be categorised into two categories: soft and hard real-time 
requirements. Soft real-time means that the response from a piece of software or system 
is not highly time critical, whereas hard real-time means that the response has to come 
within a certain time frame. The internet for instance is a soft real-time environment. 
When a user requests a web page, the time it takes for all the packets of the page to 
arrive can vary significantly depending on internet speeds, server performance, conges-
tion and the route the packets take. From the users standpoint all this means is that the 
time they have to wait for the page to load will vary, but disregarding user experience, 
the service is still successful.  
The timing of functions in an automation system are often precise. How precise they are, 
depends on the application and its scheduling policies. Fair scheduling policy means less 
strict timing is required and priority-scheduling policy means that application requires 
timing that is more precise. Measurement, control inputs and computational algorithms 
precision on the other hand is very precise. 
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Other important factor in software for automation systems is usability. In a control room, 
the amount of functionality that is available to the user is vast and control room software 
can contain multiple measurement or system variable displays, warning and error infor-
mation, video feeds and other data that the user of the software must monitor. User 
interfaces are designed individually to every system and the users of the system. Its main 
function is to assist the users in their tasks. 
Quality in automation system software can be obtained by adhering to systematic soft-
ware development processes and software quality factors that are crucial in any profes-
sional software development project. One important factor related to quality is dependa-
bility and it can divided into following categories that create the acronym RAMS: 
1. reliability, 
2. availability, 
3. maintainability and 
4. safety. 
Reliability can be defined as the probability that a system will perform a specified function 
within prescribed limits, under certain environmental conditions, for a specified time. The 
limits under which reliability is judged can be quantified by defining constraints for ac-
ceptable performance. Availability, much like in the information security acronym CIA, 
means that the required resources are available when they are needed. Problems in 
availability can be disruptive to the entire system. Maintainability can be defined as the 
probability that a failed item can be restored to an operational condition within a given 
period of time. Maintainability is an important factor in a system’s recuperation and it can 
have significant effects in reducing automation system downtime. Lastly, safety de-
scribes the probability of a failure. (Stapelberg, 2009) 
Defects that have negative impacts on automation system software dependability may 
be divided into software faults, errors, failures, accidents, incidents and hazards. Soft-
ware faults are caused by malfunctioning code, which includes code that is incorrect or 
missing. This is a fault where the software is broken and therefore will never function 
correctly. An error is either a human action that produces a software fault or a manifested 
fault in the software, which is caused by the software coming across an unpredictable 
scenario and does not know how to operate. A failure, on the other hand, is a scenario 
where a system or component cannot operate within the specified limits. Failures can be 
classified into two categories: systematic and random. Systematic failures are failures 
caused by a specific set of environmental conditions or factors inherent to the system. In 
software all failures can be classified as systematic as random failures are caused by 
hard to predict variables caused by variations in materials, manufacturing process or 
26 
 
 
environmental stress. The rate of random failures can be predicted. However, predicting 
individual events is nearly impossible. (Hästbacka, 2017) 
Accidents refer to the possible damage to the system, components or users caused by 
a failure. Whereas, incidents are unplanned events that do not result in damage to the 
system or its users, but it is still an event that had potential for damage. Hazards are set 
of conditions or scenarios that might lead into an accident. All failures are the results of 
hazards but not all hazards cause accidents. (Hästbacka, 2017) 
4.6 Lifecycle and Maintenance 
Automation systems have long lifecycles. The lifespan of these systems overall can be 
measured in decades. Devices and software added to the system also increase the 
amount recourses that need to be directed towards maintenance throughout its entire 
lifecycle. New technologies bring new requirements for maintenance, and all hardware 
and software in automation systems is generally minimised. Correct maintenance in-
sures the system produces the highest possible results while minimising risks (Goss, 
2010). 
Device level Typical lifespan (years) 
Field device 10-15 
Cross-connection 15-20 
Control room 4-6 
Table 1 displays the typical lifespans of devices in the different device levels. On the field 
device level, device lifespan is typically 10-15 years, on the cross-connection level it is 
15-20 years while on the control room level typical lifespan is only 4-6 years (Goss, 
2010). 
The control room level brings the most challenges. When the system becomes more 
complex, the integration and interaction of the levels also becomes more complex. This 
is especially the case when using Custom Off-The-Shelf (COTS, alt. Commercial Off-
The-Shelf) products, which are software products that are not bespoke to every individual 
application, but are customised to some degree for every customer. In other words, in-
stead of making the software for every environment separately, they are merely adapted 
to the environments. As COTS products are being implemented more and more, auto-
mation engineers, system administrators and maintenance engineers are confronted 
with new releases that might cause compatibility issues. Furthermore, as time goes by 
software develops even faster. In order to keep systems up-to-date they have to easily 
Table 1. Typical lifespans of devices in the different device levels of automation 
systems. 
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upgradable, which automation systems traditionally are not, because upgrades on auto-
mation systems might require system downtime, which in turn, is expensive. (Goss, 
2010) 
Having professional automation engineers working at an automation system might be 
challenging. Finding people with the appropriate level of expertise, knowledge and ex-
perience in all of the systems areas and the managing a system is often delegated to a 
system administrator. The administrator is responsible for the operation and mainte-
nance of the system. Furthermore, automation technology is improving constantly mak-
ing it challenging for administrators to keep the system’s hardware and software revision 
levels up to date for both administrative and technological standpoint. Staying in budget 
and in the allowed schedule are also challenges in updating automation systems. 
(Dedzins & James, 2015) 
In addition to being challenging, having around-the-clock monitoring of an automation 
system is also cost prohibitive. Resources for monitoring an automation system are often 
scarce so they have to be invested wisely. Automation systems have maintenance and 
diagnostic tools to display information about its operational status and system alarms to 
indicate of any error situations. However, the information is provided after the incident 
so it does not act well as a precaution. (Dedzins & James, 2015) 
4.7 Correlation Rules in Automation Systems 
Correlation rules form a key functionality in SIEM systems. Just like in systems that mon-
itor IT security, automation system SIEM will combine security related events with corre-
lation rules. These rules can backtrack historical event data or analyse incoming log data 
in real-time to detect abnormal behaviour. Correlation rules in automation systems can 
vary from IT security correlation rules. (Bajramovic, et al., 2016) 
Correlation rules can be used in automation systems to detect for instance: 
1. increase in network traffic, 
2. changes in the statistical distribution of message types, 
3. improper maintenance tasks, 
4. suspect usage of employee ID or access card, 
5. suspect logging events in the system or 
6. activity outside normal working hours. 
Increase in network traffic and changes in the statistical distribution of message types 
can indicate of an attacker gaining access to the communication network and manipu-
lating messages. (Bajramovic, et al., 2016) 
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Warnings from improper maintenance task might occur for example when maintenance 
actions are performed in the wrong order. Maintenance engineer could be patching the 
system while cabinet lock-monitoring system seems to be in place and the proper 
maintenance sequence requires an unlocking event of the cabinet to occur prior to any 
maintenance events. Correlation rules can also be used to monitor that a locking event 
happens after maintenance procedures in order to make sure no areas remain unlocked. 
(Bajramovic, et al., 2016) 
Suspect usage of employee ID or access card can happen when an employee’s ID card 
is used to access physical areas, systems or resources in the monitored plant after they 
have left the plant. Any events related to a specific ID card or the employee logging into 
a system or device in the plant after the leaving event has occurred is a possible indica-
tion of malicious activity, improper functionality in the system or operator error. Related 
to this is detecting activity from employees after normal working hours or detecting that 
employees have not exited from the plant in certain amount of time. (Bajramovic, et al., 
2016) 
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5. LOG DATA IN AUTOMATION SYSTEMS 
Automation systems generate a lot of log and other measurement data. Behind a single 
switch there can be hundreds of measurement points each producing measurements on 
one-second intervals. This means that there is a great deal of data to be transferred 
through communication buses. The measurement data is integral to the function of the 
process’ control system, whereas log data might not as necessary. 
5.1 Transferring Log Data  
In automation systems, device logs are not monitored. The control room receives infor-
mation about measurements of the system but it usually does not get any log data. These 
logs are only looked at in an error situation. Specifically, when a device is not working in 
the desired way. As a result, transferring logs would require unnecessary bandwidth on 
the communication network of the system. Incorporating this with the performance re-
quirements of the process, would mean that some headroom would have to be reserved 
on the network for transferring data that is useful in rare instances. Transferring log data 
cannot interfere with the performance of the system. 
For this reason, centralised log gathering is not common in automation system. Log data 
stays with the devices on the field device level and in the case of a malfunctioning device, 
an engineer will physically go the device and access the log data. Furthermore, this en-
gineer is most often an employee of the device manufacturer or device supplier. Manu-
facturers and suppliers offer this as a service as they have intricate knowledge of the 
device. A single automation system contains devices from a multitude of suppliers so it 
is difficult for system administrators to have extensive knowledge of each device and 
their log formats and policies. 
5.2 Log formats 
All device manufacturers have their own log formats. They all will probably contain similar 
information, such as timestamps, error codes and error descriptions, but the format and 
the interpretation of the error codes, descriptions or other information would still be man-
ufacturer-specific. 
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Timestamps in particular have an important role in the log data. In order to meet real-
time requirements of ICS systems, timestamps have to comply with a predefined accu-
racy on all different components. Universal clocks are for ensuring the timestamps in 
events sent from one device are accurate in relation to timestamps from all other devices. 
Universal clocks are not, however, mandatory in ICSs and individual components usually 
have their own clocks. If devices use their own clocks, proper protocols have to be im-
plemented for reliable time-synchronisation between logging devices. If logging devices 
have time differences in their clocks, determining the sequence of events is difficult. Fur-
thermore, the accuracy of the clocks plays an important role, as the sequence of events 
that occur within a certain minimum timeframe cannot be determined. (Bajramovic, et al., 
2016) 
Timestamps have an important role in gathering log data. Events might not be recorded 
in the correct sequence. Events that occur later might be recorded before events that 
occurred earlier, but the timestamps will inform of the proper order. Time-synchronisation 
of device clocks is best implemented during the design phase of the automation system. 
If automation system logs are only analysed when problems occur and they are analysed 
from one device at a time, timestamps do not play such an important role. When analys-
ing multiple logs from multiple devices the sequence of events is important in under-
standing where the problem originated and how the error situation proceeded. 
(Bajramovic, et al., 2016) 
5.3 Handling Automation Systems Log Data 
The importance of communication in automation systems has grown in the last two dec-
ades. This is the result of transferring from using traditional fieldbus solutions to using 
TCP/IP protocol. TCP/IP has brought more complicated and thus more vulnerable com-
munication solutions to automation systems. As a result of automation systems starting 
to use TCP/IP solutions, a new sub-system has been brought to automation systems – 
communication networks. However, as the measurement data is integral to the function 
of the system where as monitoring communication components and infrastructure are 
not seen as vital as monitoring the process itself, the development of these aspects is 
usually not at the same level. (Ahonen, et al., 2019) 
Monitoring an automation system is not done only for controlling the process. Through 
monitoring, you can anticipate the service needs helping maintenance, make repairing 
issues caused by failures easier or collect data for environmental reports for example. In 
addition, monitoring is used to save resources and time, help quality control and ensure 
security. Monitoring helps improve situational awareness of the system, which in turn 
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aids engineers operating the system, maintenance measures, security and quality con-
trol. (Ahonen, 2017) (Ahonen, et al., 2019) 
On the other hand, automation engineers try to limit the amount of data to be followed in 
the control rooms, as the more data there is to be followed the more difficult it will be to 
form a good understanding of the state of the system. This is one of the reasons why 
monitoring communication networks might be sidelined in the way of process monitoring. 
The additional value that monitoring communication networks would bring have not been 
able to demonstrate enough to justify their importance to automation engineers. It has 
remained as additional service that is only used in special circumstances. It has been 
largely sold as a tool against information and specifically cybersecurity threats and its 
benefits for production overall have not been emphasised enough. (Ahonen, et al., 2019) 
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6. CYBERSECURITY IN AUTOMATION 
Cybersecurity can be divided into two categories: physical cybersecurity and non-physi-
cal cybersecurity. The former is the protection of information and assets related to infor-
mation from physical threats such as breakages, thefts, vandalism, fire, floods and other 
natural disasters. The latter, on the other hand, is concerned with protecting systems, 
networks and programs from threats emanating from the digital world. These threats are 
not just attacks but also include non-malicious threats. 
Cybersecurity can also be divided into three distinct levels: strategic, operative and tech-
nical. These levels refer more to the execution of cybersecurity countermeasures. At the 
strategic level, a company will create a strategy that defines all events and actions that 
might have a negative effect on the operations of the company or system. From these 
actions, all risks relating to cybersecurity can be identified and resources for preventing 
these events can be allocated. An important part of this level is defining acceptable re-
sidual risk that describes the risk that remains after all preventive measures have been 
implemented. Sometimes a particular risk cannot be eliminated entirely, and in these 
situations it will have to be reduced to an acceptable level. (Kääriäinen, 2019) 
The operative level directs the strategy towards real actions, and the technical level im-
plements the technical actions according to the strategy. Managing cybersecurity in a 
company would be done by maintaining the cybersecurity strategy that will set in motion 
all actions on the operative and technical levels. This requires close teamwork from the 
management and technical departments in a company. (Kääriäinen, 2019) 
6.1 Cybersecurity Objectives 
Cybersecurity has three key elements that form the information security acronym CIA: 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. Confidentiality means that only the authorised 
parties, individuals or systems have access to the information. Integrity refers to the as-
surance that data remains intact throughout its lifecycle and that no one, without proper 
permission, has tampered with it in any way. Availability means that the required data, 
systems, networks or programs are available whenever they are needed. This triangle 
applies well for IT security. However, with automation systems the more important factor 
is operational technology (OT) security. In OT security, the process and the control of 
the process are the most important aspect to secure rather than for instance information 
ending up in the wrong hands. This is a large distinction between automation systems 
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and other conventional systems involving IT. In automation systems the acronym is more 
accurate in the form AIC (Availability, Integrity and Confidentiality), which emphasises 
the importance availability over confidentiality. 
In automation systems specifically, availability concerns all IT elements such as control 
systems, safety systems, operator workstations, engineering workstations, manufactur-
ing execution systems and the communication systems between these elements and to 
the outside world (Crevatin, et al., 2005). Problems in availability can interrupt the entire 
automation process causing system downtime and corruption of the manufactured prod-
uct, both of which are costly and can take a lot of time to repair and resume to normal 
operations. Furthermore, it can cause safety issues if certain safety features are off-line. 
6.2 Cybersecurity Threats 
Automation systems might encounter a multitude of cybersecurity threats. Most threats 
that regular systems face concern also automation systems. However, automation sys-
tems tend to have long lifespans. Devices, programs and operating systems are renewed 
seldom so systems might include old and unsupported software that is vulnerable to 
attacks. These attacks include, for instance: denial of service, eavesdropping, man-in-
the-middle and various types of malware (Crevatin, et al., 2005). 
Denial of service relates to availability, in that, during an attack the target system is pro-
hibited from performing its normal functions causing financial or physical harm to the 
system and possibly its operators. During eavesdropping, an attacker would follow and 
capture communications between programs, devices, systems or people. It might not 
involve any manipulation of the data and it could be just a method of collecting sensitive 
data or perform reconnaissance for future attacks. Unlike in eavesdropping, during a 
man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker will take an active role in the communication be-
tween systems or people. As the name suggests, the attacker would place themselves 
in the middle of the line of communication so that none of the other participants would 
notice. When one participant sends data to another participant, the data would instead 
end up to the attacker, who, in turn, would relay the data modified or unmodified to the 
correct recipient. The attacker can change or collect data and the other participants 
would think they are talking to one-another directly. 
Malware is a malicious piece of software. Malwares can be categorised into multiple 
different types such as Trojans, viruses, worms, ransomwares and rootkits. Malware’s 
purposes include stopping system operation, gathering information or harnessing de-
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vices, or parts thereof, for other purposes such as bot networks. Malwares know as ran-
somware lock a user’s computer and encrypt their data so the user cannot access it. The 
ransomware then informs the user that they get their data back if they pay a certain 
amount of money, usually in the form of Bitcoin or other cyber currency because of their 
untraceability. 
In 2017, a ransomware known as WannaCrypt or alternatively WannaCry infected tens 
of thousands of computers in over 150 countries. The ransomware used a vulnerability 
found in older Windows operating systems, such as Windows XP. These older operating 
systems were (and still are) used in businesses, industrial systems and other profes-
sional environments, but not too much in peoples’ personal use. In Europe, many hospi-
tals came infected crippling healthcare systems for several hours. The British National 
Health Service had to turn away all non-emergency cases as 16 of its computer networks 
were shut down. Legacy vulnerabilities, which are vulnerabilities that affect older devices, 
are a problem in automation systems, as computers, software and operating systems 
are not updated to newer ones very often. (Wagner, 2017) 
 
Figure 9.  WannaCrypt’s user interface informing a user that the data on their com-
puter has been encrypted. (Wagner, 2017) 
Figure 9 shows the user interface for a computer infected by WannaCrypt. It is designed 
in simple way that even people with little technical knowledge could get the necessary 
information and pay the ransom. 
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One well-known malware created for automation systems is Stuxnet. It was originally 
aimed towards Iran’s nuclear facilities that were trying to enrich uranium. Stuxnet would 
specifically target certain type of Siemens programmable logic controllers in the automa-
tion systems and managed to break multiple centrifuges in Iran’s Natanz uranium enrich-
ment facility by burning out the centrifuges used in the process. In addition to Siemens’ 
devices, it also contained code that affects frequency inverters made by Finnish com-
pany Vacon. Vacon denies selling frequency converters to Iran. (McAfee, 2019; 
Drivers&Controls, 2010) 
Stuxnet is commonly believed to have been created, although both parties denied it, by 
the U.S. National Security Agency and Israeli intelligence. After its creation, it has been 
modified by different groups to target power plants, water treatment facilities and gas 
lines. Stuxnet was distributed via a USB memory stick that an employee must have in-
serted into one of the computers in the facility to contaminate the system. Subsequently 
Stuxnet has been spread to other industrial systems by accident. (McAfee, 2019; 
Rosenberg, 2017) 
There was a time when automation systems relied on security through obscurity. It in-
volves thinking that the system, devices and protocols used were too obscure for attack-
ers to exploit. However, this has not been the case for a long time now, as Crevatin et 
al. (2005) wrote about the insufficiency of this mind-set already back in 2005. 
6.3 Current State of Cybersecurity Management 
Systems with Information and automation technologies are developing and spreading 
further into different areas of society. Many automation control systems, including the 
critical infrastructure systems, were designed and built a few decades ago. These sys-
tems are developing into structures that are more complex and the threats they face are 
becoming more diverse. In the past they were designed for physical threats, however, 
currently, the amount of threats emanating from the digital world increases. Furthermore, 
as the dependencies of these systems grow, they become more difficult to manage and 
the risks increase. (Ahonen, 2017; Gold, 2009) 
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Risk are managed by: 
1. Improving detection and reaction capabilities to prevent risks. 
2. Choosing industrial components and systems from suppliers that are proven to 
be reliable. 
3. Designing and sharing cybersecurity strategies with different levels of the organ-
isation or system from the strategic level to the operational level or from the en-
terprise level to the industrial level according to ISA-95. 
4. Identifying critical systems in the entire organisation from enterprise level to in-
dustrial level, all remote access solutions and cloud solutions in order to protect 
them from threats. 
5. Managing services and supply chains from investment decisions all the way to 
the end of the systems lifecycle.  
6. Taking into consideration international customer requirements, recommenda-
tions and legislation. 
7. Implementing tested and proven technical implementations to prevent risks. 
Many of these items require extensive team effort from the different levels of an organi-
sation. Cybersecurity solutions cannot be designed and implemented separately for dif-
ferent levels as these levels have dependencies to each other that have to be managed 
through unified cybersecurity solutions. (Ahonen, 2017)  
The implementing cybersecurity proceeds in different stages. The work begins with risk 
assessments to determine the cybersecurity risks of the automation system. This is part 
of the strategic level of cybersecurity. If the company, to which the automation system 
belongs, has a cybersecurity strategy, it will come into play at this stage. (Kääriäinen, 
2019) 
6.3.1 Implementing Cybersecurity 
From the perspective of automation systems, a substantial source of cybersecurity 
threats is the communication links to the outside of the system. Communication technol-
ogies in automation systems have partially moved towards TCP/IP solutions and having 
multiple systems integrated together has widened the potential for cybersecurity threats. 
Therefore, networks in automation systems are segmented in a way that prevents com-
munications from one level of the system to another if it is not necessary. (Kääriäinen, 
2019) 
In many cases, industrial networks are separated from the internet. These networks are 
only accessible on-site and this is done in order to mitigate the risk of the system being 
infected by malware. On the ISA-95 standard, levels 3 and 4 in figure 6 are separated 
by a demilitarized zone (DMZ). In this case, levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 have no access to the 
internet. Devices outside the DMZ, on level 4, may have access to the internet. These 
devices can have communications to devices on the lower levels through a secure node 
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in the network. This node acts as an interface for communications over the DMZ. 
(Kääriäinen, 2019; Ahonen, 2017) 
DMZ reduces the risk of infection but does not remove it completely. Malware can be for 
instance brought inside the DMZ through infected devices such as external memory de-
vices. Improperly configured firewalls in the DMZ or any routers in the system can also 
let in undesired software. Routers should block all unnecessary traffic, however, in the 
worst-case scenario they are just left in default settings without doing any configuration. 
(Kääriäinen, 2019) 
Automation systems require communications with enterprise level (level 4) applications 
to exchange manufacturing and resource data. However, direct access to the automation 
system might not be required. An exception to this having remote access for managing 
the system. (Didier, et al., 2019)  
Remote access is done with a Virtual Private Network (VPN) connection. When using 
VPN, all internet traffic is routed through a specific VPN server and from the target ser-
vice’s point of view, all this traffic originates from the VPN server regardless of its true 
origin. If the VPN server is in the on-site network of the automation system, it can used 
to access the devices in the network remotely. VPN is widely used outside industrial 
solutions but industrial-grade VPN equipment should be used when accessing industrial 
systems. Furthermore, industrial-grade VPN is recommended instead of cloud-based re-
mote connectivity services (Kääriäinen, 2019). 
Modern industrial automation and control systems (IACS) are commonly required to have 
network infrastructures that are: 
1. scalable, 
2. reliable, 
3. safe, 
4. secure and 
5. future-ready. 
The term future ready refers to the support of future technologies such as Internet of 
Things (IoT). (Didier, et al., 2019)  
Internet of Things is comprised of computing devices that communicate over the internet 
without the need of human operators. Therefore, IoT devices are sometimes referred to 
as smart devices. An example of an IoT device is an oven that is connected to the inter-
net. This type of oven could be controlled remotely and it could transfer data about the 
temperature of the oven and any food items being cooked. IoT devices such as this 
create cybersecurity threats if they are not configured properly. No access control or the 
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usage of default passwords may allow malicious parties to access and control the de-
vices. When IoT devices are industrial devices the term Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) 
is often used. 
Smart factory devices can be used to streamline automation system’s operations. How-
ever, manufacturers do not always secure the products enough. This can make IIoT de-
vices vulnerable to disruptive remote exploits over the internet. (Gold, 2009) 
New TCP/IP technologies, remote access capabilities and the convergence of logical 
and physical resources means that the divide between IT and OT security is becoming 
less clear. At one point, OT and IT did generally different things and they had limited 
collaborations. As a result of the convergence of IT and OT in automation systems, it can 
be difficult to determine who is responsible for protecting the system that are owned and 
operated by the organisation. IT has experience and budget for digital security but lacks 
direct oversight of the automation system. OT supervises the automation system but is 
not mainly responsible for defending the organisation against digital threats. The enter-
prise level of the organisation is concerned with IT security, which has to be protected 
as well and the responsibility of this is on the enterprise level. (Gold, 2009) 
Focusing on OT security over IT security when implementing cybersecurity in automation 
systems is no longer given. As there is no clear divide between the two categories, it 
creates confusion. However, the spread of IT malware, such as WannaCrypt, has indi-
cated the growing need of IT security solutions in industrial control systems. (Gold, 2009) 
6.3.2 System Alarms 
Automation systems signal security risks with the use of alarms. If the process fails to 
maintain the control input values, set in the control room level and controlled by the con-
trol logic in the cross-connection level, and measured parameters exceed security levels, 
the system will sound alarms that are shown in the control room. In the case of a plant 
disturbance, usually several process variables, such as pressure, level, flow, tempera-
ture, are affected simultaneously and the operator is confronted with several alarm mes-
sages within a short time interval, and might not be able to act correctly. Single disturb-
ance in the process can result into large number of alarms, which creates an overload of 
information that is presented to the user in the control room and hide relevant data be-
cause there is too much redundant information. For this purpose, there are alarm man-
agement concepts that aim to reduce the number of alarms in situation like this. This 
helps the operator to detect the important information and react faster. (Christiansen, et 
al., 2013) 
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Alarms can be blogged by malicious software in the system. Malware such as Stuxnet 
give falsified data to the control room and therefore the system appeared to work nor-
mally without any disturbances. Stuxnet also gave false information on the commands it 
was running so they would not be identified as malicious commands. This means the 
system could be giving information that would indicate that it is not functioning as it is 
supposed to, but the information might never be seen in the control room. (Rosenberg, 
2017) 
6.4 Integration of Cybersecurity into Automation Systems 
Lifecycle 
Cybersecurity management has to be included into the lifecycle of the automation sys-
tem. This is necessary as the cybersecurity threat landscape is constantly changing and 
developing countermeasures for threats is a continuous process. Mitigating the increas-
ing number of threats cannot always be done by adding new technologies to existing 
ones. Having contingency plans for continuous cybersecurity management helps in 
keeping this as a part of the lifecycle management of the overall automation system. This 
also helps in establishing rules and distribution of responsibilities among employees. 
(Ahonen, 2017) 
There are different classifications for the stages of automation system lifecycles. The 
Finnish Society of Automation (SAS, fin. Suomen Automaatioseura ry) divides the lifecy-
cle into seven stages: 
1. definition, 
2. design and planning, 
3. implementation, 
4. installation, 
5. testing, 
6. verification and  
7. production. 
These stages are executed in sequence and each stage builds heavily on the results of 
the previous stage. This model also describes the information, support and resources 
that are required or produced during the process. These in turn help the in developing 
cybersecurity. (Ahonen, 2017) 
With cybersecurity management, it is important to iterate this process to build resistance 
for changing cybersecurity threats. This involves designing plans for the long-term de-
velopment of cybersecurity solutions that describe how solutions are deployed with the 
help of the lifecycle model when new threats are detected. Combining cybersecurity and 
physical security into one larger category simply referred to as security will also help in 
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involving cybersecurity in the automation system lifecycle. Cybersecurity should not 
looked as a separate service from regular security as they are not completely separable 
from each other. (Ahonen, 2017; Kääriäinen, 2019) 
6.5 Existing Event Monitoring Solutions for Industrial Control 
Systems 
Systems very similar to SIEM are being used to monitor industrial control systems al-
ready. This chapter describes three existing solutions for monitoring cybersecurity in in-
dustrial control systems. 
6.5.1 Darktrace Enterprise Immune System 
Darktrace Enterprise Immune System is a product developed by the company Darktrace. 
It offers cybersecurity protection for industrial ICSs, cloud environments and IoT environ-
ments from both IT and OT security standpoints. The product is made for providing full 
cybersecurity coverage for the entire organisation. (Darktrace, 2019) 
The Enterprise Immune System uses Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning to 
create patterns of normal behaviour in a system. Then it detects any activity that differs 
from this baseline for normal activity instead of trying to detect well-known patterns of 
malwares or attacks. This is the reason Darktrace gave the system the name Enterprise 
Immune System. It acts like an immune system, but in a technical enterprise environ-
ment. (Darktrace, 2019; Hall, 2017) 
Its technology is based on Bayesian probabilistic mathematics, which focuses on accu-
mulating knowledge rather than historical frequency, to estimate risk. Using an appliance 
attached to the network, it analyses the behaviour of every user, device and network 
element to build patterns of normal behaviour. (Hall, 2017) 
The Enterprise Immune System is designed to be a passive observer in a network. Con-
necting devices to corporate networks is relatively free of risks. However, this is not true 
for industrial networks, where in some applications even minor interruptions in services 
can be damaging. The Enterprise Immune System runs on a server that is connected 
passively to the ICS network. It does not interfere with the operation of the control sys-
tem. It flags anomalies for investigating but it does not influence the situation. (Darktrace, 
2019) 
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Darktrace’s Enterprise Immune System does not offer automated countermeasures to 
anomalies. For this purpose, the company has developed a separate autonomous re-
sponse solution Antigena. It has capabilities to: 
1. Stop or slow down activity related to a specific threat. 
2. Quarantine people, systems or devices. 
3. Mark specific pieces of content, such as emails, for further tracking and investi-
gation. 
Automated responses are designed to make countermeasures faster. With this the im-
pact of anomalies are minimised. (Darktrace, 2019) 
6.5.2 Siemens SINEC Network Management System 
Siemens SINEC Network Management System (NMS) is software designed for monitor-
ing and administrating networks and their devices. It is designed to incorporate FCAPS 
model made by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). FCAPS acro-
nym is comprised of the management categories fault, configuration, accounting, perfor-
mance and security and it is a model that defines what network management systems 
are required to do. (Siemens, 2019) 
Siemens describes in their technical article (Siemens, 2019) that here are different con-
cepts for tackling the challenges of digitalisation at the network level. They include pro-
prietary solutions, industry-specific solutions and special custom-made building blocks 
for systems of varying complexity. However, these concepts are united by the five man-
agement categories of FCAPS. SINEC complies with the different categories with: 
1. Fault management: Quick and easy fault localisation. 
2. Configuration management: Centralised configuration that saves resources. 
3. Accounting management: Security by testing the network and documenting 
events reliably. 
4. Performance management: flexibility through network optimisation, transparency 
through the generation of statistics, and high availability through the continuous 
monitoring of the network. 
5. Security management: management of procedural and technical security require-
ments according to standard IEC 62443. 
Siemens’ SINEC aims to be a network management system for industrial networks of 
various sizes. The digitalisation aspect of Industry 4.0 has brought the need for network 
management systems that are scalable for different industries. SINEC achieves this by 
dividing its structure into two levels: control level and operation level. (Siemens, 2019) 
SINEC consists of one control component that is located at the control level, and one or 
more operation components that are located at the operation level. The control compo-
nent is used to monitor and administrate the entire network and operation components 
do the same for subnetworks or even singular devices. These operation components are 
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configured through the control component. Operation components collect data from the 
subnetwork and parse out relevant information that is then sent to the control component. 
They can also choose which messages are ignored entirely. Operation components can 
be installed on the same computer as the control component or completely separate 
computers. (Siemens, 2018) 
SINEC NMS supports 25 separate Operation components. Each of these components 
can be connected to 500 devices. However, the maximum number of devices the system 
supports is only 500. (Siemens, 2018) 
6.5.3 Indegy Industrial Cybersecurity Suite and CIRRUS 
Indegy Industrial Cybersecurity Suite is designed for protecting industrial networks from 
cybersecurity threats that are either malicious or non-malicious. Just like Darktrace’s En-
terprise Immune System, it aims to combine the cybersecurity management and handling 
of both IT and OT environments. (Indegy, 2019a; Indegy, 2019b) 
The suite handles three aspects: Threat detection and mitigation, asset tracking as well 
as risk management. Threats are detected by identifying anomalies in the network. It has 
its own pre-made detection policies and it allows custom-made policies to be created for 
better compatibility with the target system. In addition to these policies, it establishes a 
baseline for normal activity in the system and compares current network traffic to this 
baseline. Siemens refers to using both policy-based detection and anomaly-based de-
tections simultaneously as Dual Threat Detection. (Indegy, 2019a) 
With asset tracking, Indegy tracks automatically controllers and devices on the network 
and visualises their topography to offer a better situational awareness of the system. 
Risk management, on the other hand, is handled by maintaining an up-to-date database 
of vulnerabilities that might pose a threat to the assets. Indegy does not wait for infor-
mation to be delivered from the devices. It proactively queries the state of the devices 
including firmware versions, open ports, hardware configurations and installed patches. 
This is a part of maintaining situational awareness of the system. (Indegy, 2019a) 
Indegy also offers Industrial Cybersecurity as a Service (ICSaaS). They have a prod-
uct called CIRRUS that operates in Indegy’s cloud. CIRRUS is a fully virtualized software 
that has no footprint on the system being monitored, as no hardware or software would 
be placed in the system’s network. It uses VPN to query information from devices in the 
network. (Indegy, 2019a) 
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7. PARSER DEVELOPMENT 
One of the central steps in analysing log data with SIEM systems is the parsing of the 
log data. SIEM systems are designed to take input data from various sources but it can-
not function if the data is not normalised. Normalisation is the process of separating val-
ues from the log data and storing them in the appropriate data models in the SIEM sys-
tem. For example, parsing out the username in a login event and storing it in the 
username data field in SIEM so that SIEM can correctly interpret this piece of log data. 
Alarms and correlation rules in SIEM rely on this stage as they use the systems own data 
fields as a basis of their detection and analysis.  
Different SIEM solutions offer different means for implementing the parsing logic for log 
inputs. However, this chapter illustrates how the parsing logic is programmed manually. 
The parsers is designed for a SIEM product Sentinel and the implementation is done 
with JavaScript. 
7.1 Design Phase 
Parser development starts with planning. Depending on the customer and the applica-
tion, developers of the parsers might have a full specification of the system with detailed 
descriptions of the log data format or they might only have example logs as their basis 
for planning and implementing the parser. Planning involves studying the log data and 
identifying the important pieces of information that are integral to forming situational 
awareness. The key question that should be kept in mind is what the purpose of analys-
ing this log data is. This helps in identifying the important pieces of information that 
should be collected and included in the analysis. 
The amount of information available to the developers is integral. Log data in itself can 
have a lot of data and not all of it is useful for the purpose of analysis. However, the log 
data can have information that is integral to analysis but it is not evident from simply 
viewing the data. 
Below is an example log event: 
100001; 2019-01-01 09:00:00.000; 130.230.252.62; 65432; 
130.230.137.61; 65432; login; exampleUser; Login by user exam-
pleUser.  
Important data in this example would include event ID (100001), timestamp (2019-01-01 
09:00:00.000), target system IP address (130.230.137.62), source IP address 
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(130.230.137.61), user that initiates the event (exampleUser) and type of the event 
(login). The fields seem simple and easy to understand, however, they do have some 
ambiguity. The Event ID could be a specific value given to the event by the device or 
system that produced the log or it could an archival ID that is used in the storage of the 
log event. Furthermore, it could be a primary key in a database or it could be an ID that 
indicates the type of the event.  
The timestamp could be in local time or in UTC time. In addition, it is not evident from 
the timestamp whether the date is presented in the format: year, month and date, or in 
the format: year, day and month. In addition, it is important to note that the timestamp 
uses a dot as a decimal rather than a comma. This is important when converting the date 
string to a date object in the SIEM system. 
It is also important to know what values a particular data field can have. For example, 
the message type field in the example log event is login. Knowing what values this par-
ticular field can have is important in defining taxonomies. Taxonomies are the definitions 
of the log event types. These types are used the analysis as SIEM can use taxonomies 
to categorise events into groups. 
Usually the more information is being parsed from the log data, the more useful SIEM 
will be, as it will reduce the need for manual analysis of the event. The further the analysis 
and handling of events can be automated the better it will be at producing useful infor-
mation and developing a situational understanding of the system in question. 
During the planning phase, events are also categorised into different taxonomies. Tax-
onomy is a categorisation of the event. Taxonomies may include login, logout, password 
change, malware, query and system start and shutdown. SIEM will than use these tax-
onomies to identify patterns in the events with the use of correlation rules. The example 
event is categorised as a login event, which can be deduced from the event type login 
and the plaintext description of the event at the end of the log line. 
7.2 Development and Testing Phases 
Planning phase is followed by development phase. In this phase, the parsing logic is 
implemented in accordance to the plan. In MicroFocus’ SIEM product Sentinel, every 
parser is implemented by writing the code for the parsing logic with JavaScript. In ap-
pendix A, is the code for parsing the information in the example event log and stored in 
RXMap data structure. Each of the variables stored in the RXMap are then transferred 
to Sentinel’s own fields. 
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After the parsing logic is implemented, either by writing the code for it or building it from 
already existing parsing widgets depending on the application, the parser is tested. The 
purpose of the testing phase, as in any development project, is to ensure the implemen-
tation is working as planned. Well-executed tests require extensive log data to ensure 
the parser works with all different types of events and final testing is to be done in a 
similar environment as the customer’s environment. 
Tests can also include automated tests. Unit tests can be used for testing smaller units 
in the parser and some SIEM products have their own automated test frameworks for 
testing that events are normalised correctly. 
7.3 Deployment 
When the parser is deemed to be working correctly, it is ready to be deployed. Deploying 
a parser in Sentinel requires defining a collector, connector and the event source. Figure 
10 shows these elements and their hierarchy for the example parser.  
 
Figure 10. Functioning parser running in Sentinel 
The event source represents the input log data and it has to be configured according to 
the type of the data source, which in this case is a file event source as the log data is 
read from a csv file. The event source is connected to a connector that, in turn, receives 
the data from the event source and transforms it into contextual map form for the con-
nector. The connector will then read map, parse the data according to the parsing logic 
and store it in Sentinel’s data fields. The connector in figure 10 is named Demo demo. 
 
Figure 11.  Login event presented in Sentinel’s user interface after parsing. 
Now that the event data is parsed, it is then displayed to the user in the user interface of 
the SIEM software. Figure 2 shows Sentinel’s user interface and in figure 11 is a single 
login event. The event in figure 11 is a login event by user exampleUser from the IP 
address 130.230.137.61 to IP address 130.230.137.62. In the upper left corner of the 
event, is the timestamp of the event and next to it, is the event’s name Login. Below the 
event name is the taxonomy definition and outcome of the event. As the event describes 
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a successful login, the taxonomy definition is User session Event>Create and the out-
come is Success. At the bottom of the event is the message field that contains the written 
out description of the event Login by user ‘exampleUser’ that was parsed directly from 
the log data. 
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8. HOW SIEM SHOULD OPERATE IN AN AUTO-
MATION SYSTEM 
Probably the most important factor to note is that using log data in a meaningful way by 
implementing log data handling would be a transformational project for an automation 
system. Like all projects, this would require setting goals, making risk assessments, plan-
ning resource usage and scheduling the project and its various steps. (Ahonen, et al., 
2019) 
As SIEM is an additional system that has to be planned, implemented, deployed, main-
tained and monitored, it will add costs and take additional resources throughout its lifecy-
cle. It will add workload to various people in different stages and it will also add complex-
ity to systems that are usually already complex by themselves. 
8.1 Selling SIEM for Automation Systems 
Automation engineers are interested in the process and the reliability of the automation 
system. Information security is an additional service to an automation system, as it does 
not directly affect the control process of the system. This aspect makes selling anything 
related to information security difficult. Information security incidents happen rarely and 
nobody wants to invest in a system that is needed in very special and seldom occasions. 
In order to sell SIEM to automation systems, its benefits will have to be justified to being 
beneficial to the automation process. 
Automation engineers are interested in the reliability of the system. As described in chap-
ter 4.5.3 when covering automation software requirements, reliability can be defined as 
the probability that a system will perform a specified function within prescribed limits, 
under certain environmental conditions, for a specified time. On a more general level, 
reliability could be described as the quality of being trustworthy and performing well. This 
is something cybersecurity measures can have an effect on, for the reason that with 
improvements in cybersecurity a system can detect issues faster, react with counter-
measures better suited to the issue. Recovery from incidents can also be made more 
streamline and quicker. This reduces system downtime, additional damages and produc-
tion losses.  
One issue any counter measures for cybersecurity threats will not fix is the rarity of the 
cybersecurity threat related events in automation systems. Even though reliability could 
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be improved with SIEM, it would only serve its purpose in exception situations, which in 
turn lowers the willingness to invest in such a system. Preparedness for cybersecurity 
threats is largely proactive measure and relies on the prospect that systems will be pro-
tected when the threat becomes a reality. When the system is working properly, cyber-
security might not produce any real and tangible value. This accompanied with the fact 
that SIEM will add workload to employees, and therefore consume resources during its 
entire lifecycle from planning to maintenance and inevitably decommissioning, will lower 
the desirability of incorporating SIEM systems into automation systems. 
When developing and selling SIEM, suppliers of the system might focus on better inte-
gration to the automation system. Planning and deployment phases are expensive and 
take a long time and adding SIEM to a pre-existing automation system will always be an 
alteration process. If adding SIEM will require system downtime, it will add costs and it 
probably would not be performed until the next scheduled maintenance shutdown. Shut-
downs are not performed often.  
Furthermore, in the beginning stages when all different log sources, with their different 
log formats, would be joint to SIEM will also take time. If the deployment process would 
be streamlined, it would help in selling SIEM. SIEM suppliers will have to focus more on 
the deployment phase in order to improve their appeal. 
Automation systems are on the most part all prototypes. Every system is built for a spe-
cific purpose in order to handle a specific function. Having SIEM operate in these types 
of environments will require them be highly customised. This makes their development 
as a general purpose or so called “off the rack” systems challenging. It will also make 
SIEM difficult to design to be more integrable, as all target systems are different.   
8.2 Effect on Performance 
Gathering log data might require a new network. Communication networks in automation 
systems are designed for the communication between devices in order to control the 
process. Messages that go through the network are measurement data, alarms, control 
inputs or other configuration data integral to the process. As hardware is often minimised 
in automation systems, the network might not have the capability to transfer log data 
from all the devices without affecting the performance of the system.  
With SIEM, all log sources require parsers to parse log data and plugins to connect the 
log source to SIEM. In a system with a large number of devices, this would mean that 
the parsers and plugins might take a considerable amount of storage. In addition, SIEM 
software - with any additional libraries or software - would have to be installed to the 
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computers or designated servers running SIEM, which may not be equipped to handle 
additional resource usage as again hardware is minimised in automation systems.  
8.3 Log Data Contents 
Automation system logs contain a lot of data. When implementing solutions for handling 
this log data, it is important to figure out how to take advantage of the data as much as 
possible in order to reduce additional costs. This step will also help to understand and 
map out what data is missing, and what exactly needs to be done in order to repair the 
deficiencies in the data or the infrastructure. (Ahonen, et al., 2019) 
The process of implementing log data handling in an automation system would start by 
finding out what kind of data is already collected. This involves going through the col-
lected data and analysing how it could be used to control error situations that include 
both failures in communication infrastructure and information security events. Collecting 
and storing the data is not enough on its own as using log data in a meaningful way 
requires that you carefully research on how the contents of the data could be employed. 
Information about the collection of the log data and its contents can be requested from 
the suppliers of the devices. (Ahonen, et al., 2019) 
After analysing the existing log data, you have to find out what objectives regarding error 
control are missed. In automation device logs, there can be many information security 
events that are missing, such as unauthorised or unnecessary sign-in events, software 
upgrades, configuration modifications or changes in process control inputs. (Ahonen, et 
al., 2019) When implementing SIEM, it is important to figure out what kind of events is 
the system trying to detect. SIEM uses correlation rules to do automatic analysis of 
events making it vital that the types of the events are mapped out carefully as otherwise 
the correlation rules will not work.  
At this stage, you can go through the data and find out whether the contents of the data 
is enough. Is there enough data to detect the necessary events as they are happening 
and what even constitutes as an event. SIEM is used to analyse events, but a single log 
entry in automation system might not represent a single event. Events might have to be 
constructed from multiple different log entries that may even come from different devices. 
For instance, when powering on an automation system or part of the system, is opening 
a single valve or turning on an actuator events on their own or is the start-up of the 
system the event. Making all operations, which devices make, events in SIEM means 
that there is a vast amount of input data, but it might be necessary to help produce a 
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meaningful image of the operation of the system and to help find root causes to prob-
lems. 
Log data coming from automation devices would most likely have to be enriched. For 
instance, as traditionally log data would stay at the devices, it does not include infor-
mation concerning the location of the device. In this case, it would be necessary to add 
the device IP-address and, through the IP-address, positional information from an exter-
nal database telling where the device is located in the system. This would reduce the 
need of manual analysis and make the whole process more efficient as the handling of 
the event would be automated as far as possible. 
Challenge that automation systems bring to the collection of log data is that a single 
automation system contains devices from a multitude of suppliers and device manufac-
turers who have their own log formats and means of extracting the data from devices. 
This creates the issue that collecting log data in an environment like this will not be easy. 
SIEM would require some form of centralised log handling as all the data must be brought 
to the server running SIEM in order for it to work efficiently in creating situational aware-
ness. If there is no centralised and automated log management, the data would have to 
be collected using queries. This means the data would be fetched from the devices when 
they are needed. Centralised log management could be expensive as the number log 
sources grows, and using queries could generally be more cost effective, as queries can 
be done in a distributed manner or locally if the necessary tools exist (Ahonen, et al., 
2019).  
In addition to different methods of extracting logs from devices, the problem with having 
multiple device suppliers and manufacturers is that there are many log formats. SIEM 
requires that the information content of the logs are parsed and stored in the appropriate 
fields in the system for SIEM to be able to analyse it. SIEM will not be able to do this on 
its own and for this purpose, SIEM uses parsers to extract and store the required infor-
mation. Parsers would almost always have to be custom made for every single log 
source, or log connection as they are sometimes called, as the parsing logic will be dif-
ferent for all log formats.  
Being that there are so many different devices producing log data, there would have to 
equally as many parsers made for SIEM and every new device would require its own 
new parser. Parser production is an added expense, and it would require new resources, 
skills and time. There are companies that offer parser development as a service. The 
service might be offered in conjunction with security operations centre (SOC) service 
that includes monitoring and analysis of security events, alerting and support for recovery 
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from security incidents. Outsourcing log monitoring has the added benefit that you can 
invest in around-the-clock monitoring without adding workload to existing employees. 
However, this might not be as useful if service actions are performed only during normal 
hours (Ahonen, et al., 2019). Errors might be detected, but there is still nobody to fix the 
issue. 
Parsers for SIEM can be implemented on various ways. With some older SIEM products, 
parsers have to be programmed manually by writing the code for every operation, but 
SIEM systems that are more modern, use higher-level methods for making parsers. This 
involves assembling parsers from pre-made parsing widgets instead of writing the code 
for them separately. Regardless of the parser development method, every parser re-
quires a plugin that is used to connect it to both SIEM and the log data. These plugins 
are often implemented with Java, which has to be installed and configured on the SIEM 
server and possibly the monitoring computers. Again when the number log sources 
grows, the resources the plugins require grows as well requiring processing power, data 
storage and memory as well as maintenance. 
8.4 Transferring Log Data 
Collecting log data is only the first step in utilising log data. SIEM requires logs to be 
brought to it for it to work, however, on estimate 80 % of the work and costs put into log 
handling will go into the effort for getting all the log data to be analysed (Ahonen, et al., 
2019). Instead of collecting all the log data from devices to SIEM, SIEM could be taken 
to the devices. As it is customary currently, only whenever something goes wrong the 
logs would be inspected. This could, however, be done by taking a computer with SIEM 
to the device and it would read, parse and analyse the data. This would have to be done 
in a way that does not require a reboot of the device.  
Taking SIEM to the device would, nevertheless, mean that all counter actions to events 
would still be reactionary rather than proactive, which is a problem for fast incident re-
sponse. The point of SIEM is to be constantly analysing and monitoring logs. If the sys-
tem administrators or operators have to wait for something to go wrong and then read 
the logs, it is negating the purpose of SIEM, as first you have to detect the failures on 
your own. This might also conflict with device suppliers’ interests, as it is usually their 
employee that comes to inspect the logs.  
Having no centralised log collecting will also have the disadvantage of having small data 
sets for SIEM to analyse. SIEM can use multiple log sources to build a situational image 
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of the state of the system, but this is difficult if only the logs from one device are analysed 
at once. This would not help in finding the root causes to incidents either. 
If log data is brought to a centralised location for SIEM to analyse, SIEM could be used 
to gather both log and measurement data. SIEM systems are advertised primarily as 
cybersecurity solutions but they could be used to monitor and analyse varying types of 
data. For example, SIEM can analyse measurements from a particular part of the pro-
cess and give alarms if the values exceed accepted limits or if some measurements are 
displaying abnormal amount of fluctuation. These can be programmed into a SIEM sys-
tem’s correlation rules. 
8.5 Analysing and Understanding Log Data 
One growing trend in SIEM and log handling is the use of cloud platforms. Cloud plat-
forms could be used to store and analyse data and they offer high customisation with 
relatively manageable costs. Implementing cloud platforms in automation has not been 
without its problems as they have issues with the real-time requirements of automation 
systems. Handling log data for event analysis would not be subject to as strict real-time 
requirements. There are products, such as ServiceNow, that utilise cloud platforms for 
log analysis and incident response. They can create automated countermeasures and 
further analysis to events, which is something SIEM systems do not normally offer. On 
the other hand, transferring large quantities of log data that an automation system pro-
duces, via the Internet or Ethernet could be an issue. Furthermore, storage needs will 
grow and that can become a large expense in cloud platforms. 
After storing the data and making it available for analysis tools, comes the difficult phase 
of analysing the data with proper understanding of the system that is being monitored. 
SIEM can use general or system specified correlation rules to detect the type of activity 
happening in the system based on alarms or other log data. However, as automation 
systems are complicated systems with an abundance of devices that can produce 
alarms, building the proper understanding and making of the activities and making cor-
relation rules is difficult. This can be aided with machine learning and implementing smart 
correlation rules. 
Historical data from known error situations in the automation system can be used to 
teach SIEM systems with machine learning capabilities. These SIEM systems will ana-
lyse the test data and build their own correlation rules based on the activity found from 
the test data. Machine learning can also detect patterns in system activity that human 
operators could not find due to the complexity of the system and the event sequence. 
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Machine learning in SIEM can help in reducing the need for human monitoring of SIEM 
and help in investigating security related alerts. An issue that reoccurs in enterprise SIEM 
solutions is false positive alerts. The false positive alerts can hide legitimate alerts as 
they might be bundled in with wrong alerts in an effort to detect correlations between 
events that in reality are not connected. (Canner, 2019).  
Machine learning can also reduce the need of cybersecurity specialists in the monitoring 
stage. Cybersecurity understanding can be built into the system through machine learn-
ing just as well as correlation rules. This results in not needing as many specialised en-
gineers for monitoring SIEM while reassuring its effective operation at all times. (Canner, 
2019) 
On the other hand, implementing machine learning requires a lot of data that is used in 
the learning process. Data like this might not exist for automation systems and integrating 
smart SIEM systems with machine learning into new automation systems would be diffi-
cult. Using data from other systems is problematic because of the unique nature of each 
automation system. 
Furthermore, implementing machine learning in itself does not guarantee good security. 
SIEM systems with machine learning have to be configured and taught properly. Even 
though these systems are sometimes referred to as intelligent SIEM systems, they can 
just as well work improperly or produce false results. As all cybersecurity solutions, they 
require monitoring and maintenance. They cannot be just set to work and then forgotten. 
8.6 Detecting Anomalies Instead of Attacks 
One big obstacle in finding malicious objects or identifying attacks is that they are con-
stantly changing. In order to find them, the anomaly patterns they are searched with have 
to be developed with a continuous rate. However, the patterns of normal activity in auto-
mation systems does not change as fast. If there are changes to the systems normal 
activities, they are already known beforehand. Making modifications to the detection sys-
tem based on the changes is therefore easier. Any deviation from normal activity that is 
not known beforehand is a possible threat situation. 
Moreover, cybersecurity threats are not limited to malicious activity. They can be opera-
tor errors, configuration errors or malfunctioning devices that result in compromises in 
cybersecurity. Monitoring systems that detect anomalies instead of known patterns of 
malicious activity can also identify non-malicious threats. This is what Darktrace’s Enter-
prise Immune Systems aims to do. 
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Darktrace’s Enterprise Immune Systems also uses AI and machine learning to make the 
baseline for normal activity. This reduces the need for tailoring correlation rules to fit a 
specific system. The anomaly detection system uses data of the monitored system to 
learn by itself what normal behaviour is. Anomaly detection based on machine learning 
makes the anomaly detection system more applicable to both IT and OT environments, 
as it is not highly dependent on the target system. This in turn helps in managing the 
entire organisations cybersecurity on all industrial and enterprise levels. 
8.7 Monitoring Events 
SIEM’s purpose is to take log data in, analyse it and present meaningful information to 
the user or operator concerning the event and the state of the operational system. For 
this to work there has to be someone monitoring SIEM at all times. Part of SIEM’s effi-
ciency is that error situations are noticed immediately and the appropriate countermeas-
ures are taken to mitigate the effects of the error. Without outsourcing monitoring, this 
step will add workload for existing staff in considerable way and it will act as a strain on 
resources. Furthermore, as process automation systems run continuously, the need for 
monitoring would also be continuous. 
Currently in automation systems, log data stays at the devices. The logs are not moni-
tored per say and once an error situation occurs the logs are read from the device. Fur-
thermore, this is usually done by an employee of the supplier. This is means that the 
response would almost always be reactionary rather than proactive. From information 
security standpoint, this is not a very good approach, as the damage will most likely be 
done once the logs are read. 
Properly configured SIEM might detect problems before they happen while displaying 
the user only the integral parts of the event data. SIEM can use the whole log data as 
part of its analysis but only display parts of it to the user hiding everything that is unnec-
essary, sensitive or irrelevant altogether. This will reduce the need of manual analysis, 
as only integral parts of the data that are needed for any follow-up actions are shown. 
People responsible for the monitoring would require knowledge of both industrial auto-
mation systems and cybersecurity. Cybersecurity specialists have expertise on analys-
ing and handling cybersecurity events but, if they lack the knowledge of automation sys-
tems, forming an understanding of the state and situational awareness of the system is 
difficult. Automation engineers have the understanding of the automation system but 
might lack the expertise to analyse log data from a cybersecurity perspective. Further-
more, the design phase of the SIEM implementation process requires extensive 
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knowledge of automation systems in order to make it effective. For instance, correlation 
rules for automation systems SIEM would have to be customised for the system being 
monitored. Automation systems in general require their own correlation rules as the sys-
tems are themselves unique. 
8.7.1 Security Operations Centre (SOC) 
Security Operation Centres (SOC) are centralised operational centres that monitor event 
data and provide incident response and incident recovery. Their service is to provide 
accurate situational awareness. SOC is usually operated by cybersecurity specialists, 
engineers and analysists who work with the incident response teams of the monitored 
organisation or system. (Brook, 2018) 
SOC is used to monitor critical infrastructure. In these cases, they do not only analyse 
data from their clients, but they also analyse data from other similar fields and systems 
from different countries in order to create a better understanding of threats their clients 
might face. SOCs are most likely situated off-site and its operators can do operations 
remotely, which requires extensive knowledge of the client’s system.  
In automation systems, this can be difficult as almost all systems are unique, possible 
remote operations are not extensive and SOC operators might lack knowledge of auto-
mation engineering. In addition, no operations can be done without the permission of the 
administrators of the client’s system. This means that having extensive around-the-clock 
monitoring can be cost-prohibitive in smaller less critical systems if there is nobody on-
site to assist in the countermeasures. 
8.7.2 Follow-up Actions to Error Situations 
As stated in chapter 3.5 event data handling can be divided into three parts: automated 
processing of data, manual analysis of the parsed data and follow-up actions. SIEM tra-
ditionally is responsible for the first part but human interaction has been required in the 
two other parts. The further the process of handling events goes automatically the better, 
because there is less manual analysis to be done. While some are of the mind that the 
human operator should be removed from the chain altogether, others might be hesitant 
for legal and ethical reasons. With a human in the chain, countermeasures to error situ-
ations would be initiated by that person which puts emphasis on the importance of mon-
itoring. Getting near real-time event data to the control room will not be meaningful if the 
response to any errors is too slow, and the more manual work the user has to perform 
the slower the response will be. This in turn puts emphasis on the importance of the 
automated data analysis and SIEM. 
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Algorithms are good at detecting complicated and quiet correlations in events. Smart 
algorithms, which might be marketed as artificial intelligence, have their use in analysing 
log data. Algorithms usually require large data sets to provide material from which they 
learn patterns but there are also algorithms being developed that can work with smaller 
data sets. The downside to algorithms is that they are not good at assessing risks caused 
by incidents to the process or the organisation. Therefore, human operators still often 
perform an important function in the process. (Ahonen, et al., 2019)  
SIEM are good at taking data in from various sources, however, the data usually stays 
at SIEM. If you want to automate the process of handling events further, event data has 
to be exported from SIEM. If data can be exported from SIEM in compatible formats, it 
could be integrated to the rest of the control room software to make automatic alarms 
and safety measures. If it cannot be exported, it will stay completely separately at SIEM. 
Companies such as ServiceNow offer products that help in the automated response of 
security events. However, they are often aimed at business’ IT management and not 
industrial technology management. Integration with existing control room technology 
would still be an issue, but they could create platforms for faster incident response. 
If SIEM is deployed in a system, it should be configured to provide a meaningful function 
in the system it is monitoring. The danger of taking a new log handling system in use is 
that it is never utilised properly and it is only used to appeal to legal mandates or provide 
surface level assurance that the process is further secured with automated log handling. 
If SIEM is not working properly, it will only act as an added strain on the system and its 
operators. It might also hide problems rather than reveal them as the operators trust in 
that it would do a lot of the detection and analysis of events when in reality it might not. 
8.8 Maintaining SIEM 
Log handling and SIEM both require maintenance. It is not enough to implement and 
deploy SIEM, as it needs to be maintained in order to insure it works properly over time 
and especially after any modifications to the system. Maintaining SIEM should be con-
nected with regular service operations so that its function could be monitored. For exam-
ple updating devices or their software can change the format of their logs. These format 
changes, and especially new devices, require new parsers and plugins. New parsers 
require people to do the planning, implementation and testing. This might take a large 
amount of time and resources and it is important to weigh the costs and benefits to de-
cide whether it even is beneficial. Does the system provide enough value to the whole 
automation system to justify its costs? Enriching log data should be done close to the 
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devices that send the data to minimise the costs that would be caused by changes in the 
structure of the automation system. (Ahonen, et al., 2019) 
SIEM will add workload in multiple areas. SIEM and log handling in general would have 
to be taken into consideration when making any changes to the system. When a device 
is added, you also have to plan and implement the means of retrieving the logs. The 
skills to do this might not exist in-house nor on the supplier’s side, which would mean 
that another party would have to be employed to implement the retrieval of the logs.  
SIEM would also be a new system for operators to learn. SIEM requires users to monitor 
and use it and it could be done by designated SIEM specialist or it could be an added 
functionality for operators in the control room to monitor. In any case, employees would 
require training to use SIEM so it would be utilised properly. 
8.9 Team Effort from SIEM Suppliers and Customers 
Better implementation of SIEM would require team effort from the suppliers of SIEM, 
device suppliers and customers who are planning to use SIEM. Device suppliers could 
put effort on creating easily interpretable logs and provide information on the contents of 
the data. This would make their integration with SIEM easier and cheaper to the cus-
tomer. It would not make it cheaper to the suppliers and manufacturers of the devices 
but added business opportunities and partnerships with SIEM suppliers would improve 
their position on the market.  
From the viewpoint of automation systems, SIEM developers should aim to make prod-
ucts more open and lighter. Currently SIEM systems are not very open and require a 
considerable amount of resources with their dependencies. Many of them use Java, 
which is relatively heavy software to be added to multiple devices in an automation sys-
tem. SIEM would have to be something that does not put a strain on the existing re-
sources for it to appeal to automation engineers. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
Security Information and Event Management systems, or SIEM systems for short, are 
log management tools that provide automated log analysis and event detection. They 
parse large amounts of log data and form events that they use as the basis for building 
situational awareness of the monitored system. As humans are not good at interpreting 
large quantities of data, SIEM systems are used to reduce the amount of information 
displayed to system monitors while still using as much of the available data as possible 
for their analysis. When a SIEM system detects anomalies in the data, either from a 
single event, such as port scans, or from a collection of different events by applying 
correlation rules, it alerts the monitor of the activity. Good automated log analysis re-
quires little manual analysis making the first phase of event detection more precise and 
faster and any countermeasures will be able to be performed quicker minimising the 
consequences of the anomaly. 
9.1 Compatibility of SIEM and Automation Systems 
Automation systems are complicated systems with long lifecycles. They are comprised 
of a multitude of devices many of which produce logs resulting in large quantities of log 
data. Automation systems control manufacturing processes and vital infrastructure mak-
ing their reliability vital. Furthermore, increasing number of communication in automation 
systems is TCP/IP based which has brought a new set of cybersecurity threats to the 
field of automation. There was a time when automation engineers could rely on security 
through obscurity, however, the technology used in automation systems are much more 
well-known and tools for creating damage are more readily available meaning the im-
portance of protecting automation systems from cybersecurity threats is necessary. 
Event detection is one way to improve preparedness. 
To an automation engineer the performance and reliability of the system are the most 
important aspects, and anything that does not improve these factors is difficult to sell to 
an automation engineer. SIEM systems are seen as additional services and cybersecu-
rity threat related events are rare. Engineers do not want to invest in a product that be-
comes useful in rare exception situations and on other times acts as a strain on re-
sources. 
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However, as information security in automation systems has to focus more on IT security 
and not only on OT security, new ways of handling the security of IT have to be imple-
mented in automation systems. SIEM is primarily a service and a tool for IT security and 
it can be used as a protective tool for the growing landscape of digital threats. 
One fundamental issue with applying SIEM to an automation system is that in automation 
systems centralised log management is not a common practice. SIEM requires log data 
to be readily available, but automation systems are not traditionally built for this as logs 
stay at the devices. They are not transferred anywhere. In order to implement SIEM, first 
step would be to implement a way to bring the log data from the devices to SIEM. This 
would be a large and expensive transformational process.  
Moreover, all devices produce logs in different formats. Hence, each device would re-
quire its own custom-made parser to accommodate the log joint. The log data would 
most likely not suffice as is, and it would have to be enriched with for instance location 
information in order for it to provide meaningful information that could be used to build 
situational image of the entire system. 
Having SIEM will also add workload and consume resources during its entire lifecycle. It 
requires planning, deploying and maintenance. SIEM would have to be taken into con-
sideration during every maintenance operation to the automation system because 
changes in the automation system will cause changes in SIEM and log management in 
general. Furthermore, SIEM will have to be monitored at all times for it to a meaningful 
tool in event management. 
Furthermore, for SIEM to be a viable way to do event management, it would require 
team-effort from SIEM suppliers, device suppliers and the end-customers. Devices 
should produce logs with more uniform formats and more quality informational content, 
automation systems would need to implement centralised log management in larger 
scale and SIEM producers would need to create lightweight, open pieces of software 
with good integrational capabilities with automation systems. As they are now, automa-
tion systems and SIEM systems are not very compatible. 
9.2 Future of SIEM  
In the future, applications for systems like SIEM will most likely increase. Future applica-
tion, for instance, might be access control, network monitoring on a large scale and per-
formance analysis. All for the effort for automating data analysis and improving situa-
tional awareness. (Vesamäki, 2016) In addition, SIEM systems could be incorporated 
with modern data collection devices by collecting biometric data in the field of healthcare 
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or integrating SIEM to much larger systems outside the purely technical industries. On 
the other hand, one issue SIEM is facing is performance under very large input of data. 
Scaling up might be a limiting factor with certain SIEM systems. A single SIEM system 
can handle only a certain amount of events per second. When it receives too many 
events in one small succession, it will have to store some events to a buffer to wait until 
it has successfully handled the previous events. This is a problem for the systems situa-
tional awareness, as events are not handled in real time. 
SIEM might expand from monitoring systems to monitoring the security awareness of 
entire organisations. However, using employee filled reports about security anomalies 
and implementing security teams’ guidelines might not be straightforward but not impos-
sible either. This would be achievable with SIEM technology as it exists today, but im-
plementing it would be laborious. (Vesamäki, 2016) 
One very futuristic idea of SIEM is that it could be self-learning and self-acting. Vesamäki 
writes about this in his article for Viestintävirasto (2016). He considers that the technol-
ogy for that already exists in some form. However, he also states that this is not likely 
happen any time soon, as that would remove the human actor from decision process 
between event and reaction. 
Topics for future studies could be studying the applications of SIEM in monitoring organ-
isations at large. Instead of using SIEM to monitor singular systems, it might be used for 
overseeing the whole of the organisation. The challenges of this might include the wide 
variety of events to be monitored and privacy concerns raised by having an all-encom-
passing monitoring system. 
9.3 Event Management System Alternatives for Automation 
Anomaly detection systems are an alternative for using SIEM in industrial control sys-
tems. These anomaly detection systems do not try to find specific behaviour of known 
malwares or attacks, but they form models of normal activity of the monitored system. 
This allows anomaly detection solutions to detect both malicious and non-malicious ac-
tivity regardless of whether their patterns of activity are known or unknown. Furthermore, 
anomaly detection accompanied with machine learning and AI creates the possibility 
for smart detection systems that are not highly system-specific. 
Automation systems were previously mainly concerned with OT security. However, cur-
rently the divide of OT and IT security in industrial control systems is becoming less clear 
and the need for cybersecurity solutions that can handle both is growing. Smart anomaly 
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detection systems, for the reason that they are not highly system-specific, are a good fit 
for monitoring both IT and OT security. 
Industrial Cybersecurity as a Service is a service model that offers cloud-based solu-
tions for cybersecurity monitoring and management. Their advantages are that they need 
minimal hardware and software on-site while offering computing power and data storage 
off-site. This means that these systems have a small footprint on the system that is being 
monitored. Disadvantages are that all data has to be transferred through VPN. The 
amount of data that is transferred can be vast and using VPN can cause issues in real-
time requirements. 
Overall, SIEM products as they are now will most likely not be incorporated to automation 
systems on a large scale. Both automation systems and SIEM systems would require 
extensive modifications for this to happen. 
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APPENDIX A: PARSING LOGIC EXAMPLE IN JA-
VASCRIPT 
Collector.prototype.initialize = function () { 1 
 this.CONFIG.params.usernameIsCaseSensitive = true; 2 
 this.CONFIG.params.datanameIsCaseSensitive = true; 3 
 this.CONFIG.params.hostnameIsCaseSensitive = false; 4 
 5 
 return true; 6 
}; 7 
 8 
Collector.prototype.cleanup = function () { 9 
 return true; 10 
}; 11 
 12 
Connector.prototype.sendQuery = function () { 13 
 return true; 14 
}; 15 
 16 
Record.prototype.preParse = function (e) { 17 
 if (this.CONNECTION_ERROR != null || typeof this.RXMap ==  18 
  "undefined") { 19 
  return false; 20 
 } 21 
 var headerRegex = new RegExp("id;timestamp;source_uri;" + 22 
   "source_port;" + 23 
   "destination_uri;destination_port;type;username;" + 24 
   "message"); 25 
  26 
 if (headerRegex.test(this.s_RXBufferString)){ 27 
  return false; 28 
 } 29 
  30 
 return true; 31 
}; 32 
 33 
Record.prototype.parse = function (e) { 34 
 var input_data = this.s_RXBufferString.safesplit(";", "\""); 35 
 this.id = input_data[0]; 36 
 this.dateTime = DateTime.parseExact(input_data[1],  37 
  "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss.SSS"); 38 
 this.source_uri = input_data[2]; 39 
 this.source_port = input_data[3]; 40 
 this.destination_uri = input_data[4]; 41 
 this.destination_port = input_data[5]; 42 
 this.type = input_data[6]; 43 
 this.taxonomy_key = input_data[6]; 44 
 this.username = input_data[7]; 45 
 this.message = input_data[8]; 46 
  47 
 if (this.taxonomy_key == "login" || this.taxonomy_key ==  48 
  "logout" || this.taxonomy_key == "password_changed"){ 49 
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  this.severity = 1; 50 
 } 51 
 else { 52 
  this.severity = 3; 53 
 } 54 
  55 
 if (this.type == "login"){ 56 
  this.event_name = "Login" 57 
 } 58 
 else if (this.type == "logout"){ 59 
  this.event_name = "Logout" 60 
 } 61 
 else if (this.type == "login_failed"){ 62 
  this.event_name = "Login Failed" 63 
 } 64 
 else if (this.type == "password_changed"){ 65 
  this.event_name = "Password Changed" 66 
 } 67 
 68 
 if (false) { 69 
  this.sendUnsupported(); 70 
  return false; 71 
 } 72 
 return true; 73 
}; 74 
 75 
Record.prototype.normalize = function (e) { 76 
 e.setObserverEventTime(this.dateTime); 77 
 e.setTaxKey(this.taxonomy_key); 78 
 instance.SEND_EVENT = true; 79 
 return true; 80 
}; 81 
 82 
Record.prototype.postParse = function (e) { 83 
 return true; 84 
}; 85 
 86 
Record.prototype.reply = function (e) { 87 
 return true; 88 
}; 89 
